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THE PEAHEN’S TALE, OR DRESSING OUR PARTS AT WORK
JULIE A. SEAMAN*
[W]hen the males and females of any animal have the same general habits of life, but
differ in structure, colour, or ornament, such differences have been mainly caused by
1
sexual selection . . . .
Our settled law in this circuit, however, does not support Jespersen’s position that a sexbased difference in appearance standards alone, without any further showing of disparate
2
effects, creates a prima facie case.
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I. INTRODUCTION: DRESSING THE PART
Social norms regarding body modification, ornamentation, and covering
3
exist in every known human society. And in every known human society, such
norms include gender norms: individuals are expected to adhere to certain sex4
differentiated dress and grooming codes. Gender differences in dress norms, in
5
other words, appear to be universal among human societies.
Likewise, sexual dimorphisms—differences in form between males and
females of the same species—are a common feature of animal species. Such
differences have been extensively studied by evolutionary biologists and are
widely understood as adaptations caused by sexual selection. According to the
most common understanding, males “dress up” in order to be chosen by picky
6
females. Thus, in the most famous example, the peacock evolved his
magnificent tail because peahens disproportionately chose to mate with fancytailed males. And the peahen’s tail is plain and drab because—to put it
bluntly—the males are sufficiently promiscuous and indiscriminate that she
need not waste precious biological resources making and carting around such
7
an otherwise useless accessory.
In humans, dress, broadly defined, may be viewed as in part driven by
8
similar signaling purposes that are ultimately tied to sexual selection pressures.
Human dress can serve to enhance, hide, minimize, distort, highlight, or reveal
physical, mental or emotional features that are potentially relevant to others in
the social context. Dress therefore serves various signaling and expressive
9
functions in addition to its more mundane purposes of bodily protection and

3. See Joan Entwistle, The Dressed Body, in BODY DRESSING (DRESS, BODY, CULTURE) 33 (Joanne
Entwistle & Elizabeth Wilson eds., Berg 2001) (“Dress is a basic fact of social life and this, according
to anthropologists, is true of all human cultures that we know about: all cultures ‘dress’ the body in
some way, be it through clothing, tattooing, cosmetics or other forms of body painting.”).
4. See Joanne B. Eicher & Mary Ellen Roach-Higgins, Definition and Classification of Dress:
Implications for Analysis of Gender Roles, in DRESS AND GENDER: MAKING AND MEANING 17 (Ruth
Barnes & Joanne B. Eicher eds., Berg 1993) (“Each society, or subgroup of a society, has its own rules
regarding which body modifications or supplements should declare gender roles; to our knowledge,
all make their declarations.”); RUTH P. RUBINSTEIN, DRESS CODES: MEANINGS AND MESSAGES IN
AMERICAN CULTURE 103–04 (Westview Press 2d ed. 2001) (citing J. C. FLUGEL, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
CLOTHES 25–30 (International Universities Press 1966)).
5. Cf. DONALD E. BROWN, HUMAN UNIVERSALS 130–41 (Temple Univ. Press 1991) (compiling a
list of traits of behavior and language that have been noted by ethnographers to exist in every
known human society). While “body adornment” is included in Professor Brown’s list of “human
universals,” sex or gender distinctions in dress are not. Id. Scholars of dress, however, do view such
distinctions as universal.
6. See discussion infra Part III.
7. For a summary of the various theories used to explain such fancy ornaments as the
peacock’s tail, see infra notes 114–23 and accompanying text.
8. In evolutionary biology, ultimate cause is distinguished from proximate cause. Ultimate
cause refers to the evolutionary reason that a particular behavior or trait was adaptive; proximate
causes, in contrast, are the more immediate triggers that lead to the behavior or trait being expressed
under particular circumstances. See Owen D. Jones, Evolutionary Analysis in Law: An Introduction and
Application to Child Abuse, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1117, 1128 (1997).
9. Though it is obvious that dress serves these functions, it is not always obvious exactly what
it is that particular dress is meant to signal or express. Most evolutionary psychologists assume that
many human body modifications are meant to signal (truly or falsely) those qualities that, in theory,
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warmth. Furthermore, these signals are not singular; rather, they are discursive
and multiple. For example, a business suit on a man might signal status and self11
restraint; wearing a business suit to court conveys a willingness to conform to
12
social dress norms; wearing a business suit to the beach signals something
13
altogether different; a woman in an identical men’s suit sends yet another set of
14
signals entirely. Therefore, while the original dress feature might signal one or
15
more of a number of behavioral or social characteristics, once that signal
becomes embedded in the web of social dress norms, adherence to or rejection of
the signal carries an additional set of signals that bear on traits related to social
16
conformity, risk-aversion, rebelliousness, and the like.

are valued in the particular mating market. Most broadly, these are youth, fertility, and in some
cases sexual availability or chastity in females, and wealth and status in males. See generally DAVID
M. BUSS, THE EVOLUTION OF DESIRE: STRATEGIES OF HUMAN MATING 19–72 (Basic Books rev. ed. 2003)
[hereinafter BUSS, EVOLUTION OF DESIRE]; David M. Buss, Sex Differences in Human Mate Preferences:
Evolutionary Hypotheses Tested in 37 Cultures, 12 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 1, 2, 12 (1989) [hereinafter Buss,
Sex Differences]. For a discussion of the symbolic meanings of various modes of dress, see generally
RUBINSTEIN supra note 4.
10. Scholars have posited three theories for the origin of clothing: the modesty theory, the
protection theory, and the adornment theory. See BUSS, EVOLUTION OF DESIRE supra note 9, at 20–33.
Ethnographic research suggests that protection is unlikely to have been the original purpose of
clothing because there exist societies in harsh climates where persons do not wear nor appear to
need any bodily covering. However, once clothing is worn, the natural body defenses diminish and
people become dependent on the clothing. See id. at 22–24. However, even in those societies devoid
of clothing, the people wear some form of ornamentation or alter their bodies in some way. See id. at
20 (“while there are many societies in which the people are unclothed, there are no societies in which
the people are unadorned”).
11. The classic male suit minimizes bodily features and thus seems the opposite of the peacock’s
tail. See RUBINSTEIN, supra note 4, at 86–88 (“The male suit in its form-following style denied the
body; in its somber color it repudiated public expression of feelings.”).
12. Cf. Devine v. Lonschein, 621 F. Supp. 894 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (upholding judge’s policy
requiring male attorneys to wear ties in the courtroom because policy appropriately sought to
maintain decorum); Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 222 (2d Cir. 2005) (finding that an
employee’s violation of the haircut policy was a legitimate basis for her firing, even after she took
steps to comply with the policy, because “violating the rule [was] a form of insubordination”).
13. See ALISON LURIE, THE LANGUAGE OF CLOTHES 13 (Random House 1981) (“[T]he two-piece
tan business suit and boldly striped shirt and tie that signify energy and determination in the office
will have quite another resonance at a funeral or picnic.”).
14. See MALCOLM BARNARD, FASHION AS COMMUNICATION 171 (Routledge 1996) (“Non-verbal
signs such as items of fashion and clothing, like linguistic signs, then, take their meanings from the
context, or syntagm, in which they appear.”).
15. For example, in the Laboya culture of eastern Indonesia, adult individuals always carry a
purse that contains ingredients for chewing betel, a plant that is integral to their social relationships.
This betel purse reveals, at a glance, its owner’s sex, marital status, age, and social status. See
Danielle C. Geirnaert, Purse-Proud: Of Betel and Areca Nut Bags in Laboya (West Sumba, Eastern
Indonesia), in DRESS AND GENDER: MAKING AND MEANING 56–70 (Ruth Barnes & Joanne B. Eicher
eds., Berg 1992).
16. See RUBINSTEIN, supra note 4, at 3 (“Most social scientists . . . recognize that a person’s attire
can indicate either conformity or resistance to socially defined expectations for behavior.”); see also
Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ’g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1087 (5th Cir. 1975) (en banc) (noting that the
employer “believed that the entire business community it served—and depended upon for business
success—associated long hair on men with the counter-culture types”). Joan Roughgarden, an
evolutionary biologist at Stanford, has recently argued that male animal ornamentation similarly
might have evolved to serve a “social inclusionary” function rather than through sexual selection.
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Though social norms regarding sex differences in dress have lost much of
their force in recent years as so-called “unisex” fashions and gender cross-over
in certain styles of dress have become fairly common, there still exist a number
of dress conventions that are identifiably “male” and “female” in American
culture. Thus, for example, skirts and dresses continue to be strongly coded as
17
18
female, whereas ties are strongly coded as male. When such sex-specific social
conventions are not only performed in the workplace but are actually mandated
by employers, difficult doctrinal and normative issues arise.
Courts have for years addressed challenges to employer dress codes that
differentiate between men and women in conformance with widely-accepted
19
social dress norms. The outcomes of these cases, along with their reasoning and
analysis, are increasingly difficult to reconcile across the spectrum of situations
in which the issue arises. In rationalizing their holdings, courts have engaged in
analytic contortionism of the highest degree. However, there may ultimately be
no logical way to reconcile decisions that prohibit employers from requiring
women to wear revealing outfits and others that permit employers to require
20
them to wear makeup, or decisions that prohibit penalizing a woman for being
insufficiently feminine and others that permit penalizing a man for being
21
insufficiently masculine. In addition, the increasing judicial acceptance of the
sex stereotyping theory of sex discrimination under Title VII is in substantial
tension with recent cases that insist that sex-differentiated dress and grooming

See JOAN ROUGHGARDEN, EVOLUTION’S RAINBOW: DIVERSITY, GENDER, AND SEXUALITY IN NATURE
AND PEOPLE 175–81 (Univ. of Cal. Press 2004).
17. This particular item of dress appears to be very stubbornly resistant to attempts to broaden
its appeal to men. Some avant-garde fashion designers, most notably Jean-Paul Gaultier, have
repeatedly tried to market dresses and skirts for men with very minimal success. See DIANA CRANE,
FASHION AND ITS SOCIAL AGENDAS: CLASS, GENDER, AND IDENTITY IN CLOTHING 195, 201 n.21 (The
University of Chicago Press 2000); BARNARD, supra note 14, at 112.
18. See, e.g., RUBINSTEIN, supra note 4, at 51–52 (“An essential element of male dress that is
symbolic of holding in one’s feelings is the necktie or cloth”); see also Susan Kaiser, Minding
Appearances: Style, Truth, and Subjectivity, in BODY DRESSING, supra note 3, at 88 (assuming that ties
are strongly coded male by relating the story of “a feminist professor [who] describes how she wears
‘pervertized ties’ with many of her outfits to undermine dominant masculinity”).
19. These cases arise primarily under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2 (2000), which generally prohibits sex discrimination in the workplace, but they also may be
brought under state anti-discrimination statutes and, in the case of public employees, § 1983 and the
Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., Lockhart v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp., 795 P.2d 602 (Ore. Ct. App.
1990); Zalewska v. County of Sullivan, 316 F.3d 314 (2d Cir. 2003).
20. Compare, e.g., EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (holding
defendant employer’s policy requiring female lobby attendants to wear a sexually provocative
uniform violated Title VII) with Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006) (en
banc) (holding that defendant employer’s policy requiring only female bartenders to wear makeup
did not violate Title VII).
21. Compare, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins 490 U.S. 228 (1989), with Smith v. Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1978); see Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and
Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1 (1995)
(arguing that, despite the fact that the cases squarely considering the issue of discrimination against
effeminate males were decided pre-Price Waterhouse, it remains doubtful whether an effeminate
man in the typical case would prevail in a Title VII challenge to discrimination against him on the
basis of his effeminate behavior).
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requirements that “merely” conform to existing social gender norms do not
amount to impermissible sex discrimination.
Most courts and scholars who have addressed this tension have attempted
to draw lines such that some sex distinctions in dress requirements survive legal
scrutiny while others fail. These approaches highlight various aspects of sexdifferentiated dress rules that are seen as especially relevant or problematic.
Whether the focus is upon subordination, power differentials, autonomy,
freedom of expression, mutability, or the simple unfairness of being placed in an
23
impossible Catch-22, these various approaches bring into sharp relief the
existence of the many strands that have become entangled in the employee dress
cases.
This article proposes an analysis of employer dress codes that draws its
inspiration from an examination of the reasons for sex distinctions in “dress”
among nonhuman animals. Part II describes the contradictions inherent in the
various lines of dress and grooming cases. This part teases apart the various
doctrinal and theoretical strands to show that there are several separate
elements in play, sometimes operating at cross-purposes. Part III explains the
theory of sexual selection, which accounts for the striking dimorphisms in
coloration, feathers, weaponry, and ornamentation among nonhuman animals.
As this discussion reveals, there is a strong element of female choice and female
power that is directly correlated with the type and extent of sexual dimorphisms
in animals.
Part IV draws upon insights from the study of animal dress, along with the
anti-caste view of Title VII, to propose a partial solution to the problem
presented by the Title VII dress cases. Drawing a line that could be applied
easily by courts, this Part proposes that any employer policy that requires
females to be more highly decorated than males—including policies that require
women to wear makeup or to wear clothes that reveal more of their bodies than
24
the corresponding male dress requirement —should be deemed to run afoul of
Title VII’s prohibition of discrimination because of sex. It further argues that the
analogy to animal dress implies that there is no such thing as a sex-specific dress
25
26
code that is de minimus or that equally burdens males and females.

22. I place this word in quotation marks to emphasize that it is the courts, and not I, who find
objections to these employer sex distinctions trivial. See, e.g., Tavora v. N.Y. Mercantile Exch., 101
F.3d 907 (2d Cir. 1996) (characterizing male plaintiff’s claim that defendant-employer’s hair-length
policy violated Title VII because it prohibited long hair for men but not women as an argument that
“Title VII applies to any employment policy with any difference between men and women, no
matter how trivial”). As I argue in Part IV.A, infra, sex differences in dress are far from trivial.
23. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251 (“An employer who objects to aggressiveness in women
but whose positions require this trait places women in an intolerable and impermissible catch 22: out
of a job if they behave aggressively and out of a job if they do not.”).
24. In determining which items of dress fall under this rubric, I draw on both sexual selection
and sociological accounts of dress and gender. See discussion infra Parts III and VI.
25. Many courts state that dress and grooming requirements are trivial or de minimus under
Title VII. See, e.g., Tavora, 101 F.3d at 908; Knott v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 527 F.2d 1249, 1252 (8th Cir.
1975); Dodge v. Giant Food, Inc., 488 F.2d 1333, 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Pacenka v. Fareway Stores,
Inc., 672 N.W. 2d 800, 804 (Iowa 2003).
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By offering sexual selection theory as a lens through which to examine
dress codes in the workplace, I do not mean to suggest that it answers every
27
question nor that it provides normative answers simply based on analogy to
evolutionary explanations of ornamentation and sexual dimorphism. I do not
argue, for example, that because there exist sexual dimorphisms in dress in
nonhuman animals, that such differences are “natural” and therefore acceptable
28
or desirable. Nor do I wish to suggest that, because there may be some
biological or evolutionary basis for sexual dimorphisms in human social dress
norms, that employee grooming choices should for that reason be granted
29
greater protection under Title VII. However, an evolutionary perspective that

26. See, e.g., Frank v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845, 854 (9th Cir. 2000) (articulating
“unequal burdens” test); Bedker v. Domino’s Pizza, 195 Mich. App. 725, 729 (Ct. App. 1992)
(applying unequal burdens test); Fountain v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 555 F.2d 753, 756 (9th Cir. 1977).
27. Clearly, a biological, genetic, or evolutionary explanation of human behavior cannot by
itself answer prescriptive questions about the desirability or moral status of the behavior. Though
the so-called “naturalistic fallacy” has resulted in much heat, most scholars who draw on
evolutionary theory in legal analysis are careful to distinguish description from prescription. See,
e.g., Kingsley R. Browne, Biology, Equality, and the Law: The Legal Significance of Biological Sex
Differences, 38 SW. L.J. 617, 654 (1984) (“A recognition that certain behavioral sex differences have
their origins in biology does not in any way answer the question of whether the differences are good
and to be fostered by society, or bad and to be suppressed.”); John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty in
the Era of Genomics, 29 AM. J.L. & MED. 439, 451–52 (2003); Julie A. Seaman, Form and (Dys)Function in
Sexual Harassment Law: Biology, Culture, and the Spandrels of Title VII, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 321, 361 (2005).
As John Stuart Mill so astutely put it in criticizing the tendency to deduce moral “ought” from
natural “is”: “nature impales men, breaks them as if on the wheel, casts them to be devoured by wild
beasts, burns them to death, crushes them with stones like the first Christian martyr, starves them
with hunger, freezes them with cold, poisons them by the quick or slow venom of her exhalations,
and has hundreds of other hideous deaths in reserve.” 10 COLLECTED WORKS OF JOHN STUART MILL
385 (J.M. Robson ed., 1969), quoted in ROBERT WRIGHT, THE MORAL ANIMAL: WHY WE ARE THE WAY
WE ARE 331 (Pantheon 1994).
28. Indeed, the comparison to nonhuman animals is at best analogical or perhaps even
metaphorical, since most nonhuman animal “dress” is biological and therefore not under the
animal’s behavioral control, whereas human dress is by definition something that we humans add to
or deliberately change on our biological bodies. With respect to nonhuman animals, this distinction
breaks down at the margins. Some species do in fact exhibit behaviors that alter their “dress,”
broadly defined. For example, bower birds in Australia build and decorate elaborate structures,
called bowers, which females inspect before choosing a male with which to mate. The satin bower
bird, “decorates his display court with blue, yellow and white objects including feathers, flowers,
leaves, snail shells, and, where available, plastic and paper, over a background of yellow straw.”
Gerald Borgia, Why Do Bower Birds Build Bowers?, 83 AMER. SCIENTIST 542, 544 (1995). When a female
chooses to enter the bower, the male puts on an elaborate mating display, which culminates in his
“puff[ing] up his feathers, hold[ing] his wings at his side, fac[ing] the female with a small
decoration—usually a yellow leaf—in his mouth and perform[ing] a series of knee bends.” Id. In this
example, the male bower bird is in a sense decorating and enhancing his immediate physical
environment so as to appear more attractive to females. The existence of this and other examples of
courting behaviors that encompass decorative displays perhaps demonstrates the artificiality of the
distinction between biology on the one hand and environment, behavior, and culture on the other.
Cf. Owen D. Jones, Time-Shifted Rationality and the Law of Law’s Leverage: Behavioral Economics Meets
Behavioral Biology, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1141, 1168 (2001) (“Arguing about whether or not a given
behavior is the product of genes or culture is (as is often noted) like arguing about whether the area
of a rectangle is the product of its length or its width.”).
29. This factor lies at the heart of one of the primary rationales by which courts have rejected
sex (and race) discrimination challenges to employer grooming requirements. Because dress is under
the individual’s control and is viewed as a matter of choice, courts tend to distinguish discrimination
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considers the ultimate reasons for sex differences in dress does help to
distinguish those dress codes that should be permitted from those that should
not, given the normative goals as derived from the statutory language and

based on dress from discrimination based on such immutable characteristics as race and sex. Several
courts have articulated a test by which such requirements are permissible unless they target either
an immutable trait or a constitutionally protected fundamental right. See Harper v. Blockbuster
Entm’t Corp., 139 F.3d 1385 (11th Cir. 1998) (hairstyle is not an immutable characteristic); Earwood
v. Cont’l Se. Lines, Inc., 539 F.2d 1349 (4th Cir. 1976); Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ’g Co., 507 F.2d
1084 (5th Cir. 1975) (hair length is neither immutable nor a fundamental right); Wiseley v. Harrah’s
Entm’t, Inc., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14963 (D.N.J. August 4, 2004) (hairstyle not immutable
characteristic); Barrett v. Am. Med. Response, N.W., Inc., 230 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (D. Ore. 2001) (beards
not immutable nor fundamental right); Austin v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1254 (N.D.
Ind. 1998) (hairstyle is not an immutable characteristic); Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (prohibition on all-braided hairstyles does not target immutable characteristic or
fundamental right); EEOC v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 34 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16105 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 5,
1980) (holding that weight is neither immutable nor a fundamental right); Lanigan v. Bartlett & Co.
Grain, 466 F. Supp. 1388 (W.D. Mo. 1979); Air Line Pilots Assoc. v. W. Airlines, Inc., 1979 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 7890 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 1979) (holding that weight is neither immutable nor a fundamental
right); Thomas v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 392 F. Supp. 373 (N.D. Tex. 1975); McConnell v.
Mercantile Nat’l Bank at Dallas, 389 F. Supp. 594 (N.D. Tex. 1975); Jahns v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 391 F.
Supp. 761 (E.D. Mo. 1975); Pecenka v. Fareway Stores, Inc., 672 N.W.2d 800 (Iowa 2003) (ear stud
neither immutable characteristic nor fundamental right); Pik-Kwic Stores, Inc. v. Comm’n on Human
Rights & Opportunities, 170 Conn. 327 (1976); Planchet v. N.H. Hosp., 115 N.H. 361 (1965); Ind. Civil
Rights Comm’n v. Sutherland Lumber, 182 Ind. App. 133 (1979); Albertson’s v. Human Rights
Comm’n, 14 Wash. App. 697 (1976); Page Airways of Albany, Inc. v. N.Y. State Div. of Human
Rights, 50 A.D. 83 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975).
Notions of mutability might also account for the increasing tendency of courts to recognize
discrimination against transgendered persons—those for whom there is a disjunction between
sexual identity and the sexual organs with which they were born—as sex discrimination. See, e.g.,
Smith v. City of Salem (Ohio), 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004); Schroer v. Billington, 424 F. Supp. 2d 203
(D.D.C. 2006); Mitchell v. Axcan Scandipharm, Inc., 97 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 960 (W.D. Pa.
2006). Transsexualism is specifically excluded as a disability under the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12211(b)(1). E.g., Johnson v. Fresh Mark, Inc., 98 Fed. App’x 461 (6th Cir. 2004) (per
curiam) (dismissing transsexual’s ADA claim on this ground). Nonetheless, some courts do seem
influenced by a diagnosis of Gender Identity Disorder (GID) and by the implication that experienced
gender identity is not under the free control of the plaintiff. Though they do not specifically mention
mutability, such attention to the medicalized nature of transgenderism probably springs from a
similar impulse to protect plaintiffs against discrimination for traits they cannot control or change.
See, e.g., Smith, 378 F.3d at 568 (6th Cir. 2004) (noting that the plaintiff “began ‘expressing a more
feminine appearance on a full-time basis’—including at work—in accordance with international
medical protocols for treating GID”); Schroer, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 205 (noting that the plaintiff was
diagnosed with gender dysphoria, and describing in detail the standards for treatment of the
condition formulated by the leading organization for the study and treatment of gender dysphoria).
30. As noted supra at note 8, ultimate causation in biology has a specific meaning that is
distinguished from proximate cause: “Proximate causes involve physiology and biochemistry as
well as an organism’s unique developmental history. Ultimate causes involve the history and
reproductive consequences of behavior, viewed in evolutionary time.” Owen D. Jones, Law and the
Biology of Rape: Reflections on Transitions, 11 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 151, 174 (2000). Professor Jones
uses the example of a male bird’s singing in spring: proximate causes “include the hormonal
changes triggered by the lengthening of successive days, the activation of particular motor neurons
to the vocal apparatus, and each bird’s individual experience of songs heard and songs practiced.”
Ultimate causes, in contrast, “address the ‘purposes’ of singing—claiming territory, advertising
genetic fitness, and attracting mates—all of which contribute to reproductive success and have thus
been favored by natural and sexual selection.” Id.
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history or from other policy considerations. By looking more deeply at why
males and females—nonhuman and human alike—dress their parts, it may be
possible to unravel the doctrinal strands and to begin to weave a more coherent
32
and suitable legal fabric.
II. WHO WEARS THE PANTS: SEX-SPECIFIC DRESS RULES IN THE WORKPLACE
As one might expect given the pervasiveness of social norms that
33
differentiate appropriate female from male dress, the workplace is no exception
to gendered expectations regarding dress. Whether explicitly stated or as part of
the background fabric that governs who is deemed to “fit in,” whether
embodied in formal written policies or informal understanding and practice,
sex-specific norms governing what individuals may or must wear exist in many
34
35
workplaces.
Courts have addressed such sex-differentiated
dress

31. Evolutionary analysis itself cannot supply a normative or policy goal; rather, the usual
method of applying evolutionary insights to legal questions “looks to norms or policies supplied
from an outside source (the legislature, for example), and then examines evolutionary explanations
of behavior in order to explore their potential usefulness in shaping such behavior to further the
given goal.” Seaman, supra note 27, at 364. An alternative method, which I also employ here, is to
look to evolutionary explanations of behavioral patterns in order to reveal the salience of certain
traits or the relative power dynamics that underlie particular behaviors. For a comprehensive
discussion of the possible uses of evolutionary analysis in law, see Owen D. Jones & Timothy H.
Goldsmith, Law and Behavioral Biology, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 405 (2005).
32. Clothing metaphors and idioms are very common in the English language (and, likely, in
most other languages as well). Several of these idioms suggest themes of clothing as concealment,
for example: a wolf in sheep’s clothing; an iron fist in a velvet glove; to draw a veil over something.
Many more, however, suggest “clothing as behavior,” for example: a feather in one’s cap; at the drop
of a hat; by the seat of one’s pants; off the cuff. See ROSAMUND MOON, FIXED EXPRESSIONS AND IDIOMS
IN ENGLISH: A CORPUS-BASED APPROACH 204–05 (Oxford Univ. Press, USA 1998). Though not
specifically noted by Moon, other clothing metaphors imply power and submission: who wears the
pants; lick someone’s boots; too big for one’s britches.
33. In all known societies, human dress has clear gender associations and is sexually dimorphic
in some way. See, e.g., CRANE, supra note 17, at 16 (asserting that, although clothing fashions also
communicate messages about class and social power, “their principal messages are about the ways
in which women and men perceive their gender roles or are expected to perceive them”); MALCOLM
BARNARD, FASHION AS COMMUNICATION 112 (Routledge 1st ed. 1996) (noting that while sex
differences in dress are virtually universal, they vary widely in the particulars of what denotes
masculinity and femininity in dress).
34. Dean Bartlett has pointed out that “[d]ress and appearance expectations are pervasive and
persist even in the absence of mandatory codes.” Thus, she argues that “eliminating dress and
appearance discrimination . . . in the workplace is not as simple a matter as the critics [of judicial
rationales for upholding sex-based dress codes] suggest.” Katharine T. Bartlett, Only Girls Wear
Barrettes: Dress and Appearance Standards, Community Norms, and Workplace Equality, 92 MICH. L. REV.
2541, 2545–51 (1994).
35. Throughout this article, I refer to employer policies that apply differently depending upon
the sex of the employee as “sex-specific” or “sex-differentiated” appearance codes. I use the word
“sex” rather than “gender” in this context because the employer has chosen to tie the appearance
standard to the biological sex of the employee rather than to his or her gender identity, which may in
some cases diverge from biological or chromosomal sex. See, e.g., JOHN MONEY & ANKE A.
EHRHARDT, MAN & WOMAN, BOY & GIRL: THE DIFFERENTIATION OF DIMORPHISM OF GENDER IDENTITY
FROM CONCEPTION TO MATURITY (The Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1973) (originating the distinction
between sex and gender, and distinguishing between anatomical, chromosomal, and hormonal sex
on the one hand, and psychological gender identity on the other); ANNE FAUSTO-STERLING, SEXING
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requirements in a growing body of case law in which plaintiffs have challenged
36
such rules as unlawful sex discrimination. Though both the EEOC and the
courts in the early cases often viewed facially sex-differentiated appearance
codes as violative of Title VII, this formal equality framework soon gave way to
the view that it was perfectly appropriate—and legal—for an employer to
instantiate social dress and appearance norms even where these differed
according to sex. Throughout its development, this line of case law has
struggled to fit within the larger doctrinal framework; however, the fit has often
seemed more akin to that of an ill-suited hand-me-down than a tailor made
garment. Recent sex-stereotyping cases reveal that the existing framework is in
danger of splitting at the seams.
In Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Company, the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, upheld an employer-mandated appearance code
that required female bartenders to wear foundation, blush, and lipstick to work,
and to tease or style their hair every day, while prohibiting male bartenders
37
from doing so. It is probably fair to say that this ruling, as with the prior
38
39
decisions in the case by the district court and the appellate panel, came as
40
something of a surprise to many scholars. It is worth asking why this would be
so. The legal rules that the court applied were unremarkable in the sense that
41
they have been established doctrine for some time. And yet the application of
BODY: GENDER POLITICS AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF SEXUALITY 3–5 (Basic Books New ed. 2000)
(discussing the sex/gender dichotomy). In discussing male-female differences in nonhuman
animals, I also use the word “sex” rather than “gender” inasmuch as most discussions of sex
dimorphisms in animals do not recognize the sort of cultural and social gender components as are
well-established in the literature on human gender identity. See ROUGHGARDEN, supra note 16, at 23
(“To a biologist, ‘male means making small gametes, and ‘female’ means making large gametes. Period! . . .
Beyond gamete size, biologists don’t recognize any other universal difference between male and
female.”) (emphasis in original). Roughgarden goes on to argue that there is a diversity of gender
expression among animals. See id. at 30–105. Though I view the distinction between sex and gender
as a useful heuristic and as a powerful critical tool, as a descriptive matter both the sex/gender
divide and the animal/human divide are less clear at the edges than is usually imagined.
36. Note that some of these cases arise under the Constitution or state or local
antidiscrimination legislation, but the analysis is generally the same as that under Title VII. See, e.g.,
Page Airways of Albany, Inc. v. New York State Div. of Human Rights., 50 A.D.2d 83 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1975) (in case brought under New York Human Rights Law, court looks to federal case law to
interpret analogous provisions of state antidiscrimination law); E. Hartford Educ. Assoc. v. Bd. of
Educ., 562 F.2d 838 (2d Cir. 1977) (where plaintiff challenged dress code under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments, court held that the plaintiff’s right to dress as he pleased was not
fundamental).
37. See Jespersen, 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
38. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 280 F. Supp. 2d 1189 (D. Nev. 2002).
39. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 392 F.3d 1976 (9th Cir. 2004).
40. Or, if surprise is too strong a word, at least it seems that many considered the result
sufficiently remarkable that it merited extended discussion, including the Symposium of which this
Article is a part.
41. The “unequal burdens” standard, which the court applied, is well-established in the Ninth
Circuit as a primary test for sex-differentiated dress and grooming codes. See Gerdom v. Cont’l
Airlines, 692 F.2d 602, 605 (9th Cir. 1982). Under this standard, such employer rules, though they
explicitly apply differently to men and women, do not amount to sex discrimination under Title VII
unless they impose “unequal burdens” on one or the other sex. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1109 (applying
“settled law in this circuit” that “[a]n appearance standard that imposes different but essentially
equal burdens on men and women is not disparate treatment” under Title VII) (quoting Frank v.
THE
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these settled rules to the case of Darlene Jespersen, a longstanding and highly
42
regarded employee who was fired for refusing to wear makeup to work,
43
sparked a flurry of commentary in the legal literature.
Why should the outcome of this case have generated such widespread
comment and consternation? One reason is that the “unequal burdens” test used
44
by the court was first articulated prior to the Supreme Court’s landmark
decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, which recognized that sex stereotyping
45
could constitute sex discrimination under Title VII. As the sex stereotyping

United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845, 854 (9th Cir. 2000)). Though not explicitly applying the unequal
burdens test, other circuits had applied a similar standard to sex-differentiated appearance rules
prior to Gerdom. See, e.g., Knott v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 527 F.2d 1249 (8th Cir. 1975) (reasoning that
because grooming requirements were imposed on both male and female employees, the sexes were
treated equally and there was no violation of Title VII); Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ’g Co., 507
F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that slight differences in grooming standards for male and female
employees do not violate Title VII when those grooming standards are applied to all employees in
and evenhanded manner).
42. The majority noted that “Darlene Jespersen worked successfully as a bartender at Harrah’s
for twenty years and compiled what by all accounts was an exemplary record.” Jespersen, 444 F.3d at
1107.
43. See, e.g., David B. Cruz, Making Up Women: Casinos, Cosmetics, and Title VII, 5 NEV. L. J. 240
(2004); Catherine L. Fisk, Privacy, Power, and Humiliation at Work: Re-Examining Appearance Regulation
as an Invasion of Privacy, 66 LA. L. REV. 1111 (2006); William M. Miller, Lost in the Balance: A Critique of
the Ninth Circuit’s Unequal Burdens Approach to Evaluating Sex-Differentiated Grooming Standards under
Title VII, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1357 (2006); Megan Kelly, Note, Making-Up Conditions of Employment: The
Unequal Burdens Test as a Flawed Mode of Analysis in Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 36 GOLDEN
GATE U. L. REV. 45 (2006); Jennifer L. Levi, Clothes Don’t Make the Man (or Woman), But Gender Identity
Might, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 90 (2006); Hillary J. Bouchard, Casenote, Jespersen v. Harrah’s
Operating Co.: Employer Appearance Standards and the Promotion of Gender Stereotypes, 58 ME. L. REV.
203 (2006); Recent Cases, Title VII—Sex Discrimination—Ninth Circuit Holds that Women Can Be Required
to Wear Makeup as a Condition of Employment—Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 392 F.3d 1076 (9th
Cir. 2004), 118 HARV. L. REV. 2429 (2005). For an enlightening examination of the facts, procedural
history, and legal and social context of the Jespersen case, see Devon W. Carbado, G. Mitu Gulati &
Gowri Ramachandran, Makeup and Women at Work, HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. (forthcoming 2006).
44. The unequal burdens test, under which grooming or appearance rules that explicitly differ
based on sex are nonetheless permissible so long as the grooming requirements as a whole are
equally burdensome to both men and women, was first announced in Gerdom v. Continental Airlines,
692 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1982). In Gerdom, the court struck down weight requirements for female flight
attendants but distinguished earlier cases that had upheld such limits by emphasizing that in those
cases “unlike this case, no significantly greater burden of compliance was imposed on either sex; that
is the key consideration.” Gerdom, 692 F.2d at 606. See also Fountain v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 555 F.2d
753, 756 (9th Cir. 1977) (affirming employer’s right to change the dress code for either sex in order to
prevent it from becoming “overly burdensome” to either sex); Laffey v. Nw. Airlines, 366 F. Supp.
763 (D.D.C. 1973), vacated and remanded in part and aff’d in part, 567 F.2d 429 (1976) (holding that
airline policy prohibiting female, but not male, flight attendants from wearing eyeglasses was a
violation of Title VII, and reasoning that the rule forced female flight attendants to wear contact
lenses, which “are substantially more expensive than eyeglasses with lenses of comparative
quality.”). EEOC guidelines in effect prior to the Price Waterhouse decision adopted the unequal
burdens theory of discrimination in the context of sex-differentiated grooming codes. See EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, 2 EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 619.4 (1981) (“So long as
[dress code] requirements are suitable and are equally enforced and so long as the requirements are
equivalent for men and women with respect to the standard or burden that they impose, there is no
violation of Title VII.”).
45. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
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46

theory of sex discrimination has gained greater judicial acceptance, it has
begun to push at the edges of the foundational rationales that ground the dress
47
and grooming cases. However, other cases, including some in the Ninth
Circuit, have continued to apply the unequal burdens standard to employee
48
appearance codes well after Price Waterhouse. Thus, the mere fact that the
Jespersen court continued to apply this test to a sex-differentiated grooming rule
seems insufficient reason for the case to have generated the type and degree of
notice that it has.
The presumption behind the unequal burdens test is that different
treatment of men and women is not per se actionable. In essence, it is the
49
“separate but equal” standard imported into the law of sex discrimination. A
46. In 2004, the Sixth Circuit held that a male-to-female (MTF) transsexual firefighter whose coworkers told him he was not sufficiently masculine and who was subsequently suspended had
sufficiently pleaded claims of sex stereotyping and sex discrimination under Title VII and Price
Waterhouse. See Smith v. City of Salem (Ohio), 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004); see also Barnes v. City of
Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729 (6th Cir. 2005); Dawson, 398 F.3d 211 (2d Cir. 2005) (implicitly approving sex
stereotyping theory of sex discrimination in case of masculine woman); Simonton v. Runyon, 232
F.3d 33, 38 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting that discrimination against a homosexual based on a sex
stereotyping theory might be actionable because it “would not bootstrap protection for sexual
orientation into Title VII because not all homosexual men are stereotypically feminine, and not all
heterosexual men are stereotypically masculine”). District courts have also held that penalizing
transsexual individuals for dress and grooming that crosses societal gender boundaries may
constitute sex discrimination under Price Waterhouse. See Mitchell v. Axcan Scandipharm, Inc., 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10824 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 13, 2006) (following Price Waterhouse and finding sexual
stereotyping could be a basis for a Title VII sexual discrimination claim). Other courts have found
that impermissible sex stereotyping existed in non-dress contexts. See, e.g., Back v. Hastings on
Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that school psychologist could
state a claim under Title VII where she alleged that she was not promoted because her supervisors
believed that women with young children could not both be a good mother and a committed
worker, exhibiting an impermissible sex-stereotype).
47. The essence of the sex stereotyping theory of sex discrimination is that an employment
decision may not be premised upon an employee’s failure to “match the stereotype associated with
[her] group.” Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251. The Sixth Circuit has interpreted the Supreme Court’s
decision in Price Waterhouse to mean that “an employer who discriminates against women because,
for instance, they do not wear dresses or makeup, is engaging in sex discrimination because the
discrimination would not occur but for the victim’s sex.” Smith, 378 F.3d at 574. In similar fashion,
taking the theory of sex stereotyping discrimination to its logical conclusion would also seriously
undermine the argument that sexual orientation discrimination is not sex discrimination. See Vickers
v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 764 (6th Cir. 2006) (“Ultimately, recognition of Vickers’ claim
would have the effect of de facto amending Title VII to encompass sexual orientation discrimination.
In all likelihood, any discrimination based on sexual orientation would be actionable under a sex
stereotyping theory if this claim is allowed to stand, as all homosexuals, by definition, fail to
conform to traditional gender norms in their sexual practices.”).
48. See Frank v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2000) (“A sex-differentiated
appearance standard that imposes unequal burdens on men and women is disparate treatment that
must be justified as a bona fide occupational qualification”); see also Schroer v. Billington, 424 F.
Supp. 2d 203 (D.D.C. 2006); Bedker v. Domino’s Pizza, 195 Mich. App. 725, 729 (Mich. Ct. App.
1992); Bridges v. Carrols Corp., 66 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 43694 (E.D. Mich. 1995). Note that recent
editions of the EEOC’s guidelines, issued post-Price Waterhouse, have also continued to use this
standard. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, 2 EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 619.4 (1998).
49. Cf. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). Indeed, the rhetoric of the grooming code cases
eerily mirrors Plessy. For example, Justice Brown in Plessy stated that the Fourteenth Amendment
“could not have been intended to abolish distinctions based upon color . . . .” Id. at 544. Compare the
D.C. Circuit’s view of Congress’s intent in Title VII: “Title VII was never intended to encompass
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comparison of the language in Jespersen to earlier decisions makes clear the
essential continuity of judicial rhetoric and doctrine from the pre-Price
Waterhouse cases, through the post-Price Waterhouse cases, and to the Jespersen
case itself. In 1975, considering one of the several hair length cases in which
male plaintiffs challenged employer policies that required male employees to
wear short hair but allowed female employees to wear their hair long, the
Eighth Circuit stated that:
Defendant’s hair length requirement for male employees is part of a
comprehensive personal grooming code applicable to all employees. While no
hair length restriction is applicable to females, all employees must conform to
certain standards of dress. Where, as here, such policies are reasonable and are
imposed in an evenhanded manner on all employees, slight differences in the
appearance requirements for males and females have only a negligible effect on
50
employment opportunities.

A decade after the Supreme Court held that Ann Hopkins had suffered sex
discrimination when her employer penalized her for failing to conform to
51
socially entrenched gender stereotypes, the Ninth Circuit stated that “[a]n
appearance standard that imposes different but essentially equal burdens on
52
men and women is not disparate treatment.” In Jespersen, the court simply
reaffirmed this standard, stating that “companies may differentiate between
men and women in appearance and grooming policies” unless the policy in
53
question “creates an ‘unequal burden’ for the plaintiff’s gender.”
Perhaps, then, it was the application of the test, rather than the test itself,
that was somewhat unanticipated. In Jespersen, the court refused to take judicial

sexual classifications having only an insignificant effect on employment opportunities.” Dodge v.
Giant Food, Inc., 488 F.2d 1333, 1337 (D.C. Cir. 1973). In Plessy, the Court focused on what it viewed
as the reasonableness of the railroad’s regulation, and it provided, in contrast, examples (drawn
from Plessy’s arguments) of rules that would be patently unreasonable and therefore
unconstitutional: “requir[ing] separate cars to be provided for people whose hair is of a certain color,
or who are aliens, or who belong to certain nationalities, or to enact laws requiring colored people to
walk upon one side of the street, and white people on the other, or requiring white men’s houses to
be painted white, and colored men’s black, or their vehicles or business signs to be of different
colors, upon the theory that one side of the street is as good as the other, or that a house or vehicle of
one color is as good as one of another color.” Plessy, 163 U.S. at 549–50. Likewise, courts in the
grooming cases have fallen back upon the notion of reasonableness to explain why employers may
enact rules that treat men and women differently on their face: “We may take judicial notice that
reasonable regulations prescribing good grooming standards are not at all uncommon in the
business world, indeed, taking account of basic differences in male and female physiques and
common differences in customary dress of male and female employees, it is not usually thought that
there is unlawful discrimination ‘because of sex.’” Fagan v. Nat’l Cash Register Co., 481 F.2d 1115,
1117 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
50. Knott v. Mo. Pac. R.R Co., 527 F.2d 1249, 1252 (8th Cir. 1975) (holding that minor differences
in appearance regulations that “reflect customary modes of grooming do not constitute sex
discrimination within the meaning of § 2000(e).”).
51. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 228 (holding that, once a plaintiff has shown that gender was a
motivating factor in the employment decision, the employer could avoid liability only if it showed,
by a preponderance of the evidence, that the decision would have been the same regardless of
gender).
52. Frank, 216 F.3d at 854.
53. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating. Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
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notice of the asserted fact that a rule requiring women to wear substantial
amounts of makeup and to tease or style their hair was more burdensome than a
corresponding rule requiring men to wear no makeup and to keep their hair cut
54
short. In dissent, Judge Kozinski argued that the plaintiff had raised a triable
issue of fact on the issue of unequal burdens because, among other reasons,
“Harrah’s policy requires women to apply face powder, blush, mascara, and
lipstick,” and “[y]ou don’t need an expert witness to figure out that such items
55
don’t grow on trees.” It may be that a makeup requirement such as that at issue
in Jespersen seemed, as it did to Judge Kozinski and the other dissenters, so
patently burdensome that the court’s refusal to notice the burden came as a
surprise.
Or it may be that it was not the obvious nature of the unequal burden, but
the obviousness of the sex stereotyping that underlay the makeup policy that
gave those watching the case pause. The Jespersen majority held that a sexdifferentiated grooming policy could constitute sex discrimination in either of
two ways: (1) if it unequally burdened men and women, or (2) if it reflected and
enforced an impermissible sex stereotype. Thus, while the court recognized that
the sex stereotyping theory of sex discrimination might apply to invalidate a
56
workplace dress code, it held that the theory did not apply to invalidate the
57
Harrah’s code at issue in Jespersen.
The Jespersen court thus rested this part of its holding upon an asserted
distinction between dress codes that reflect socially accepted gender appearance
norms, which it found unproblematic, and those based upon impermissible sex
stereotypes, which might violate Title VII. The difference between a gender
norm on the one hand and an impermissible stereotype on the other was only
imprecisely defined in Jespersen, but the court did offer some clues as to what
sorts of sex-differentiated appearance codes would raise sex stereotyping
58
issues. These clues are significant because they are representative of the threads
of analysis that run through the appearance code cases in general and that
comprise the forms upon which the patterns of rhetoric in these cases have been
sewn. And these themes, it turns out, raise some intriguing analogies to the
animal “dress” literature.

54. The court stated: “Jespersen asks us to take judicial notice of the fact that it costs more
money and takes more time for a woman to comply with the makeup requirement than it takes for a
man to comply with the requirement that he keep his hair short, but these are not matters
appropriate for judicial notice.” Id.
55. See Id. at 1117 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). Judge Kozinski also argued that it undeniably takes
substantial time and effort to apply make-up, as even non-makeup wearers know based on “the
hundreds of hours we’ve spent over the years frantically tapping our toes and pointing to our
wrists.” Id. Finally, Judge Kozinksi recognized that, wholly irrespective of time, effort, or money,
there is a non-trivial dignitary and privacy burden in forcing a person who strongly objects either to
wear makeup or quit her job. See id. at 1117–18.
56. See Id. at 1113 (majority opinion) (“We emphasize that we do not preclude, as a matter of
law, a claim of sex-stereotyping on the basis of dress or appearance codes.”).
57. See id.
58. Scholars have noted the extreme lack of clarity in judicial treatment of the concept of
stereotyping. See, e.g., Anita Cava, Taking Judicial Notice of Sexual Stereotyping, 43 ARK. L. REV. 27, 28
(1990) (“Court opinions use the word [stereotype] without defining it.” (alteration added)).
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There are three lines of cases in which female plaintiffs have had some
success in challenging workplace appearance codes. First, some women have
prevailed where they have demonstrated that the appearance code at issue
59
required them to appear in sexualized or provocative clothing. Second, but
closely related, is a series of cases in which courts have upheld challenges to
60
certain airline maximum weight policies. Finally, some courts have found sex
discrimination where women were required to wear uniforms but their male
61
counterparts were permitted to dress in business attire. Each of these pockets of
judicial skepticism of sex-differentiated appearance codes finds a mirror image
in the reasoning of the Jespersen opinion.
The Jespersen majority distinguished Price Waterhouse on the ground that,
unlike the sex stereotyped notions applied to Ann Hopkins, those applied to
Darlene Jespersen did not “single [her] out,” but rather these policies “applie[d]
62
to all of the bartenders, male and female.” Harrah’s policy did not amount to
“impermissible stereotyping,” said the court, first because it was not “intended
63
to be sexually provocative” or to “stereotype women as sex objects.” Were a
policy to do this, the court suggested, it could amount to an impermissible sex
64
stereotype that would violate Title VII.
This focus on the stereotype of sexual attractiveness and availability—the
requirement that women appear “sexy” and attractive at work—is a prominent,
65
though at times ambivalent, underlying theme in the grooming cases. In those

59. See EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (finding in favor of the
plaintiff where the court found as a matter of fact that defendant required her to wear a sexually
provocative uniform in her job as an office building lobby attendant). See also discussion infra notes
66–69 and accompanying text.
60. See Frank v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2000); Gerdom v. Cont’l Airlines,
Inc., 692 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1982) (en banc).
61. See Carroll v. Talman Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Chi., 604 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1979);
O’Donnell v. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 263 (S.D. Ohio 1987); EEOC v.
Clayton Fed. Sav. & Loan Assoc., 1981 WL 152 (E.D. Mo. 1981). See also infra notes 84–87 and
accompanying text.
62. This assertion on the part of the court is almost patently ridiculous. The court insisted that
the grooming policy was “for the most part unisex.” Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1112 (alterations added).
Judge Pregerson’s dissent pointed out that such reasoning would insulate any sex-differentiated
appearance code so long as it contained some provisions that applied to both men and women and
other burdensome and stereotypical requirements for both men and women. See id. at 1115–16
(Pregerson, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 1112.
64. See id. (distinguishing Darlene Jespersen’s situation from that of Margaret Hasselman, the
plaintiff in EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., discussed infra notes 66–68 and accompanying text, who “was
required to wear a uniform that was ‘short and revealing on both sides [such that her] thighs and
portions of her buttocks were exposed.’” (alteration in original)) (quoting Sage Realty Corp., 507 F.
Supp. at 604).
65. It is an ambivalent theme because of the BFOQ exception in Title VII. Even where an
employer policy discriminates on the basis of sex, the employer may defend the policy by
demonstrating that sex is a bona fide occupational qualification or, alternatively, that there exists a
business necessity for a rule that has a disparate impact on one sex. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2000).
The ironic result is that the more likely a grooming policy is to be held discriminatory on the basis of
sex stereotyping because it forces women in the workplace to appear sexy, the more likely it will
survive a Title VII challenge based on BFOQ or business necessity. This is because the most blatant
sexually-charged dress codes exist in businesses that are geared toward selling sex. See Bartlett, supra
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relatively rare instances in which female plaintiffs have prevailed in challenges
to workplace grooming codes, the cases have sometimes involved what a court
perceives as a sexually suggestive dress requirement that is unrelated to the
66
main purpose of the defendant’s business. For example, in EEOC v. Sage Realty
67
Corporation, one of the first cases to hold that an employer dress code violated
68
Title VII, the court found in favor of a female lobby “hostess” in a New York
City office building who was constructively discharged because she refused to
69
wear what the court found was a revealing and sexually provocative costume.
Similarly, in Gerdom v. Continental Airlines, Inc. the plaintiff, like Darlene
70
Jespersen, had amassed an “otherwise exemplary” employment record.
Nevertheless, she was fired from her position as a “flight hostess” when she

note 34, at 2567–79 (discussing the Hooters litigation and stating that “[t]he area where the least
visible progress has been made concerns businesses that are the most objectionable from the
perspective of reducing the subordination of women: businesses that trade on women’s sexual
objectification,” but noting that forcing these companies to “be explicit about the nature of [their]
business” in order to fall under the BFOQ defense may actually be “beneficial in the long run”
because of community norms that might “impose limits on the kinds of businesses employers are
willing, explicitly, to defend”); Kimberly A. Yuracko, Private Nurses and Playboy Bunnies: Explaining
Permissible Sex Discrimination, 92 CAL. L. REV. 147 (2004) (explaining and endorsing courts’ seemingly
strange distinction between sexual-titillation cases involving sex businesses and those involving
plus-sex businesses based on a normative worker-focused perfectionism). Professor Cruz has argued
persuasively that the BFOQ exception does not apply to employer dress policies, and that the
business necessity defense likewise is inapplicable because these are generally disparate treatment
rather than disparate impact claims. See David B. Cruz, Making Up Women: Casinos, Cosmetics, and
Title VII, 5 NEV. L. J. 240 (2004).
66. Across the spectrum of cases involving challenges to workplace dress codes, challenges by
men greatly predominate. Among these, suits involving hair length rules make up the largest
proportion of the cases. And, with only a few exceptions, these challenges by men to hair length and
other dress rules have been unsuccessful. See, e.g., Harper v. Blockbuster Entm’t Corp., 139 F.3d 1385
(11th Cir. 1998); Tavora v. N.Y. Mercantile Exch., 101 F.3d 907 (2d. Cir. 1996); Longo v. Carlisle
DeCoppet & Co., 537 F.2d 685 (2d Cir. 1976); Baker v. Cal. Land Title Co., 507 F.2d 895 (9th Cir.
1974); Dodge v. Giant Food, Inc., 488 F.2d 1333 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Female plaintiffs represent a
minority in the dress cases, but they have been more likely than male plaintiffs to prevail in their
challenges, and sometimes when their challenges have failed this has been because courts have
determined that plaintiff’s dress was not the reason for the adverse employment action. See, e.g.,
Colafemina v. Mass. Comm’n Against Discrimination, 1994 Mass Super. LEXIS 80 (D. Mass. 1994)
(finding that plaintiff had failed to prove that defendant’s legitimate reason for failing to promote
her to the position of cocktail server was pretextual, where plaintiff claimed that she was not
promoted because management believed that her breasts were too large); Marks v. Nat’l Commc’n
Assoc., Inc., 72 F. Supp. 2d 322 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (finding that plaintiff had failed to show that
overweight men were treated differently than overweight women). In sum, while relatively few
dress and appearance code challenges have been successful, those that have been successful seem to
share some notable characteristics, discussed in this Part.
67. See EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 87 F.R.D. 365 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (denying defendant’s motion
for summary judgment on Title VII claim), aff’d, 507 F. Supp. at 599; Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. at
613 (awarding plaintiff back pay, benefits, and attorneys’ fees after trial on her Title VII claim).
68. See Sage Realy Corp., 507 F. Supp. at 602 n.3.
69. The employer insisted that the costume was not sexually provocative or revealing, but the
court found as a matter of fact that it was, and that the defendant was aware that wearing the
costume had subjected Margaret Hasselman, the plaintiff-employee, to sexual harassment by
building patrons. See id. at 610–11.
70. 692 F.2d 602, 603 (9th Cir. 1982) (en banc).
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exceeded the airline’s maximum weight restrictions. The Ninth Circuit noted
that “[t]he purpose of the weight program was, according to Continental, to
create the public image of an airline which offered passengers service by thin,
72
attractive women, whom executives referred to as Continental’s ‘girls.’”
Because there was no showing that slimness was necessary to perform the job of
cabin attendant, and because men who performed similar functions were not
subject to a maximum weight requirement, the court concluded that the sextargeted policy smacked of “occupational clichés” and “stereotypical notions of
the roles of men and women” and constituted disparate treatment sex
discrimination on its face. Continental’s admission that the policy’s purpose was
to cater to the flying public’s desire to be served by sexually attractive women
was a prominent factor in the court’s reasoning in support of its holding that the
73
policy was discriminatory. The Jespersen court characterized the policy as “part
74
of an overall program to create a sexual image for the airline.”
The other flight attendant cases in which female plaintiffs have prevailed in
challenging sex-specific policies—though these were not appearance policies per
75
se —similarly involved what courts considered to be stereotypical notions of
female attractiveness and sexual availability. Thus, courts have invalidated
airline rules that restricted flight attendant positions to young, single, childless
women, holding that policies that prevented flight attendants from being
76
77
78
married, having children, or working beyond their early- to mid-thirties all
79
constituted sex discrimination in violation of Title VII. In their attempts to

71. See id.
72. Id. at 604.
73. See also Laffey v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 763, 774 (D.D.C. 1973) (employer policy
that, among other sex-differentiated provisions, required female but not male flight attendants to
wear contact lenses rather than eyeglasses, violated Title VII), cited in Frank v. United Airlines, Inc.,
216 F.3d 845, 855 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Laffey for the proposition that appearance standards that
impose unequal burdens on men and women are impermissible). One cannot help but be reminded,
reading these cases, of the famous Dorothy Parker quip, “Boys don’t make passes at girls who wear
glasses,” and of the modern variation, “Boys don’t make passes at girls with fat asses.” IMDb,
Memorable Quotes From “Will & Grace” (1998), http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0157246/quotes
(last visited Jan. 8, 2007).
74. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1109 (9th Cir. 2006) (discussing Gerdom).
75. There is some question whether even the weight cases are properly considered among the
“grooming” or “appearance” cases. In Frank, the court determined that it “need not decide whether a
rule or regulation that compels individuals to change or modify their physical structure or
composition, as opposed to simply presenting themselves in a neat or acceptable manner, qualifies
as an appearance standard,” because, even if they qualified as an appearance standard, Continental’s
weight rules “would still be invalid.” Frank, 216 F.2d at 855.
76. See generally Burwell v. E. Air Lines, Inc., 633 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 965 (1981).
77. See In re Consol. Pretrial Proceedings, 582 F.2d 1142 (7th Cir. 1978).
78. See Sprogis v. United Airlines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991
(1971).
79. The Fifth Circuit had earlier held that it was impermissible sex discrimination for airlines to
restrict hiring for the position to women. See Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inv. 442 F.2d 385 (5th
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971). The airlines, in response, changed the designation from
“stewardess” to “flight attendant,” and opened the position to men. See generally Laffey v. Nw.
Airlines, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 763, (D.D.C. 1973) (describing history of airline rules regarding flight
attendants).
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control these particular traits of its female flight attendants, the airlines tracked
very closely those traits that the sexual selection literature posits as the desirable
mating characteristics of human females: youth, fertility, health, and
80
availability.
The other main hook upon which the Jespersen court hangs it hat concerns
the extent to which the policy at issue interfered with the plaintiff’s ability to
81
perform her job because she was a woman. In evaluating Harrah’s appearance
policy—which tracked a social gender norm that women are at their “Personal
Best” only in makeup and with styled hair while men can achieve theirs with
unadorned faces and plain hair—the Jespersen majority determined that the
82
company did not place a burden on women’s ability to perform their work. In
both the “Unequal Burdens” portion of its opinion, and in the “Sex
Stereotyping” portion, the decision turned largely upon this intuition on the part
of the court.
Dismissing the plaintiff’s argument that the makeup requirement alone—
because it applied differently on its face to men and women—established a
83
prima facie case of discrimination, the Jespersen court held that, though
different, the grooming requirements that applied to men and women were not
84
unequal. According to the court, the makeup requirement was not burdensome
80. See, e.g., BUSS, EVOLUTION OF DESIRE, supra note 9, at 70 (“Men worldwide want physically
attractive, young, and sexually loyal wives who will remain faithful to them until death.”); see also
Buss, Sex Differences, supra note 9, at 1.
81. As discussed infra note 82, the Jespersen court did not quarrel with the undisputed evidence
that the makeup rule interfered with Darlene Jespersen’s ability to perform her work because it
burdened her as an individual. The court, however, distinguished this type of individual, subjective
impediment to job performance from an impediment based on sex in some general sense. See
Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2006) (stating that, if it were to
agree that Jespersen’s personal objection to the makeup policy were sufficient to state a claim of sex
stereotyping, the court “would come perilously close to holding that every grooming, apparel, or
appearance requirement that an individual finds personally offensive, or in conflict with his or her
own self-image, can create a triable issue of sex discrimination”).
82. See id. at 1112. The court recognized that Darlene Jespersen herself was severely impacted in
her ability to perform her job, but it rejected as unworkable and unwise the notion that the subjective
reaction of an individual woman to a “reasonable” grooming policy could sustain a finding of sex
discrimination. This objective burden test imposed by the court is closely analogous to the objective
element of the unwelcomeness requirement in sexual harassment law. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510
U.S. 17 (1993).
83. In order to make out a prima facie case of disparate treatment, which encompasses the
requirement of discriminatory intent, a plaintiff ordinarily must introduce either direct evidence of
discriminatory intent, or if such direct evidence is unavailable, circumstantial evidence sufficient to
raise an inference of discriminatory intent. See, e.g., HAROLD S. LEWIS & ELIZABETH J. NORMAN,
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW AND PRACTICE 164–88 (West Group Publ’g 2d. ed. 2004).
Normally, an employer policy that explicitly differentiates between female and male employees is the
paradigm example of direct evidence of discriminatory intent and by itself states a disparate
treatment claim; in such cases, a court will typically go on to determine whether the employer had
demonstrated that the differential treatment was justified as a BFOQ. See, e.g., Int’l Union, UAW v.
Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187, 200 (1991) (finding employer’s “fetal protection” policy applied to
the reproductive capacity of females but not to males, and was thus illegal sex discrimination unless
the employer could demonstrate a BFOQ). Appearance policies are uniquely exempted from this
general rule that facially discriminatory policies satisfy the plaintiff’s prima facie showing.
84. This reasoning tracks the “difference/sameness” debate in feminist legal theory, except that
there is no attempt by the court to reason that, in order to achieve employment equality, different

14__SEAMAN.DOC

440 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY

2/8/2007 2:08 PM

Volume 14:423

2007
85

to women and had “only a negligible effect on employment opportunities.” In
an exquisite example of circular reasoning, the court insisted that “[g]rooming
standards that appropriately differentiate between the genders are not facially
86
discriminatory.” Because the plaintiff had offered no evidence that “the
87
grooming standards would objectively inhibit a woman’s ability to do the job,”
she failed to demonstrate that the policy was discriminatory. This focus on the
issue of job impairment is evident in those cases that have found in favor of
female plaintiffs who challenged sex-differentiated dress and grooming
requirements.
Apart from the sexualized appearance and flight attendant cases, female
plaintiffs have also prevailed in challenging policies that required women, but
not men, to wear uniforms at work. In the leading case of Carroll v. Talman
88
Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n of Chicago, the Seventh Circuit struck down such a
policy because “when some employees are uniformed and others not there is a
natural tendency to assume that the uniformed women have a lesser
professional status than their male colleagues attired in normal business
89
clothes.” Thus, the employer’s stated justifications for the policy “reveal[ed]
90
that it [was] based on offensive stereotypes prohibited by Title VII.” In a
similar case, another court found that “it is demeaning for one sex to wear a
uniform when members of the other sex holding the same positions are allowed
91
to wear professional business attire.” These cases suggest that where a dress
code imposes a demeaning image upon one sex only, it constitutes
discrimination under Title VII.

treatment is necessary in this instance. See generally MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO
FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 39–76 (Aspen Publishers 2d ed. 2003) (discussing feminist debate over equal
versus special treatment and which approach is most likely to lead to true equality for women and
men). Rather, the reasoning of the courts in the grooming cases seems to be that, because social
norms posit that a “professional” and “attractive” appearance connotes different things for men and
women, enforcing these differences makes everyone neat and attractive and, therefore, equal.
85. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1110 (quoting Knott v. Mo. Pac. R.R Co., 527 F.2d 1249, 1252 (8th Cir.
1975)).
86. Id. at 1109–10 (emphasis supplied).
87. Id. at 1112. See also id. at 1113 (“Harrah’s grooming standards do not require Jespersen to
conform to a stereotypical image that would objectively impede her ability to perform her job
requirements as a bartender.”).
88. 604 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1979).
89. Id. at 1033. The Carroll court also rejected the unequal burdens analysis. It noted that “the
dissent relies on the fact that the female dress code ‘did not substantially burden the female employees
more than the male employees in the enjoyment of their jobs” (emphasis supplied), but that is not
the criterion imposed in Section 703(a)(1) of the Act, for that Section was ‘intended to strike at the
entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.’” Id.
(emphasis in original) (quoting Sprogis v. United Airlines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971)). See also O’Donnell v. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse, Inc., 656 F.
Supp. 263 (S.D. Ohio 1987) (holding that employer’s dress code violated Title VII where only female
employees were required to wear smocks); EEOC v. Clayton Fed. Sav. & Loan Assoc., 1981 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12388 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 11, 1981) (holding that an employer policy “requiring only female
employees to contribute to the purchase of, and to wear a uniform is prima facie evidence of
actionable discrimination,” and denying defendant’s motion for summary judgment).
90. Carroll, 604 F.2d at 1033.
91. O’Donnell, 656 F. Supp. at 266.
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Thus, the gender norms that are viewed by courts, explicitly or implicitly,
as invidious are those that relate to female attractiveness and sexiness as well as
92
those that relate to female competence and status. This is what distinguishes
“appropriate” or “reasonable” sex-differentiated dress codes from unduly
burdensome ones, and benign “norms” from inappropriate “stereotypes” in
these cases. The categories of cases in which female plaintiffs prevail are those
where employers are seen to be attempting to enhance the attractiveness or sex
appeal of female employees for a position where attractiveness should not be
93
relevant, and where female employees are compelled to wear uniforms though
94
male employees are not. In the latter context, courts reason that such policies
imply to customers that the uniformed female employees are of lesser status
95
than the non-uniformed male employees. In addition, there is the patronizing
suggestion that women are not capable of good judgment as to appropriate
96
business attire because they are competitive and subject to fashion’s whim.
III. SEXUAL SELECTION AND SEXUAL DIMORPHISM IN HUMAN AND NONHUMAN
ANIMALS: THE PEACOCK’S TAIL AND OTHER FANCY ACCOUTREMENTS
Male and female peafowl look different: Peacocks have large, unwieldy
and seemingly useless tails that they drag along behind them and then
occasionally, with regal pomp, fan out in a spectacular display of blues, greens,
and golds as they strut in circles and shimmy and vibrate their rear-ends.
Peahens, in striking contrast, have short, drably colored tails. Though peafowl

92. Clearly, these sets of norms and stereotypes are often related, as when women are seen as
suited for ornament rather than intellectual pursuits, or when their status is tied to their attachment
to a high-status male which, in turn, is viewed as dependant on youth and physical attractiveness.
93. Courts uniformly hold in these cases that customer preference for attractive female
attendants is not a defense. See, e.g., Gerdom v. Cont’l Airlines, 692 F.2d 602, 609 (9th Cir. 1982); Diaz
v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inv. 442 F.2d 385, 389 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971). As
Professor Yuracko has pointed out, however, there are two discreet areas in which courts do not
always apply this rule. See Yuracko, supra note 65, at 147.
94. Courts emphasize that there is nothing inherently problematic about uniform requirements
per se, but that the policies become impermissible when they are applied differently based upon the
sex of the employee. See O’Donnell, 656 F. Supp. 263 (D. Ohio 1987); Clayton, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) at 841.
95. See Carroll, 604 F.2d at 1033 (“While there is nothing offensive about uniforms per se, when
some employees are uniformed and others are not there is a natural tendency to assume that the
uniformed women have a lesser professional status than their male colleagues attired in normal
business clothes.”).
96. Id. Although it was not the primary rationale by which the Court of Appeals found the
uniform policy impermissible, the court was clearly troubled by the defendant’s attempt to justify
the policy by reference to “dress competition among women” and women’s tendency to “follow the
fashion” even where the fashion is problematic from the standpoint of appropriate “business
judgment.” Id. (quoting employer’s stated justification for the policy). The court found that these
justifications were grounded upon “offensive stereotypes prohibited by Title VII.” Id. As gender
stereotypes go, this one seems to strike the court as invidious rather than harmless. It is interesting
that this kind of competitiveness—in the context of fashion, attractiveness, and appearance—is
gendered female and considered a demeaning stereotype, whereas “good competition”—over work,
productivity, status—is more often gendered male.
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present a very dramatic example of sexual dimorphism, they are only one of
many species of birds, mammals, fish, and even insects that exhibit obvious
male-female differences in coloration, size, or ornamentation.
This Part lays the groundwork for understanding the evolutionary impetus
for the sorts of showy dimorphisms in coloration and ornamentation—e.g.
feathered crests or long tails, antlers, wattles, elaborate antennae—that are
exemplified by the peacock and peahen. It then layers onto the description of
basic evolutionary theory a discussion of cultural norms that inform the human
98
practice of ornamentation and, specifically, sex- and gender-differentiated
social dress norms.
A. The First Layer: Animal “Dress” and Sexual Selection
As seen in the quotation at the start of this Article, Charles Darwin
recognized sexual dimorphism within species and coined the term “sexual
selection” to describe the process by which many such sex differences could
99
100
evolve. Sexual selection, as distinct from natural selection, refers to a process
by which the sexes evolve particular traits, generally divergent traits, based on
101
102
the differential reproductive success conferred by those traits. Sexual
selection theory remains the primary explanation among contemporary
103
evolutionary biologists for most intra-species sex differences. Whereas natural
97. Dimorphism refers to “[t]he existence of two distinctly different types of individual within a
species. An obvious example is sexual dimorphism in certain animals, in which the two sexes differ in
colouring, size, etc.” OXFORD DICTIONARY OF BIOLOGY 178 (4th ed. 2000) (emphasis in original).
98. I use the word “gender” here, in addition to “sex,” because the cultural practice of layering
social expectations and normative evaluations upon persons by various technologies including dress
implicates the concept of gender as well as being tied to biological sex.
99. See DARWIN, supra note 1. See also CHARLES DARWIN, THE DESCENT OF MAN AND SELECTION
IN RELATION TO SEX (John Murray ed., 1882) [hereinafter DARWIN, DESCENT OF MAN].
100. Stated most simply, natural selection as first theorized by Darwin consists of two important
steps: first there must arise heritable variation among individuals of a particular species; next,
because some individuals, based on these differences, are better able to survive and pass along their
genes to the next generation, over time individuals with such characteristics will come to
predominate in the population. Given sufficient time and environmental pressure, Darwin posited
that the process of natural selection would lead to speciation (i.e., the evolution of new species). See
ERNST MAYR, WHAT EVOLUTION IS 117–20 (Basic Books 2001); see also OXFORD DICTIONARY OF
BIOLOGY, supra note 97, at 398.
101. An individual’s reproductive success, generally abbreviated as RS, is simply the sum total of
offspring and offspring’s offspring that the individual has been able to produce. In other words, RS
measures the individual’s ability to pass its genes to future generations. See RANDY THORNHILL &
CRAIG T. PALMER, A NATURAL HISTORY OF RAPE: BIOLOGICAL BASES OF SEXUAL COERCION 5 (MIT
Press 2000) (“We evolutionists use the term reproductive success to refer to th[ose] reproductive
interests [of an individual], by which we mean not the mere production of offspring but the
production of offspring that survive to produce offspring. A trait that increases this ability is ‘good’
in terms of natural selection even though one might consider it undesirable in moral terms.”
(alteration added)).
102. A leading scholar in the field defines sexual selection as “the differences in reproduction
that arise from variation among individuals in traits that affect success in competition over mates
and fertilizations.” MALTE ANDERSSON, SEXUAL SELECTION 31 (Princeton University Press New Ed.
ed. 1994).
103. See, e.g., id. at 13–17, 437 (discussing Darwin’s suggestion that most secondary sex traits,
which have no direct role in insemination, arise because they confer success in competition over
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selection can be expected to operate fairly uniformly upon members of a
particular group, sexual selection can create different evolutionary pressures
upon males and females in the group based largely upon the differing
104
reproductive strategies of males and females of the species.
Until the 1970’s, most evolutionists accepted the idea of natural selection
105
but ignored or disparaged Darwin’s theory of sexual selection. When they did
recognize it as a valid explanatory model, they often viewed male competition
for females—in contrast to female preference for certain traits—as the driving
106
force behind sexual selection. If larger, stronger, more aggressive, or more
dominant males tended to win the contest for access to reproductive females,
those traits, if heritable, would be disproportionately passed on to future
107
generations and would become widespread in the male population.
Explaining sexually dimorphic traits, Darwin argued that these came about
where “individual males have had, in successive generations, some slight
advantage over other males whether in their weapons, defence, or charms; and
108
have transmitted these advantages to their male offspring.” Included in those
“charms” would be traits, such as fancy tails, that females for some reason might
prefer.
Elaborating upon Darwin’s explanation, contemporary biologists typically
109
distinguish two main types of sexual selection: “intrasexual competition” and

mates, and concluding that “many secondary sex traits have now been shown [through
experimentation] to be sexually selected”); HELENA CRONIN, THE ANT AND THE PEACOCK: ALTRUISM
AND SEXUAL SELECTION FROM DARWIN TO TODAY 249 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (“Darwin was
confident that eventually ‘the idea of sexual selection [would] . . . be much more largely accepted.’ It
has taken more than a century. But his prediction has at last proved true.”) (alterations and ellipsis
in original) (internal citations omitted). But see ROUGHGARDEN, supra note 16 (challenging orthodoxy
of sexual selection as explanation for most sex dimorphisms).
104. See, e.g., ANDERSSON, supra note 102, at 31 (“Anisogamy and greater female than male
parental effort is [sic] the likely reason for stronger male than female competition over mates.”)
105. For a wonderful description and analysis of this history, see generally CRONIN, supra note
103, at 113–249. Summarizing the treatment of Darwin’s theory of sexual selection in the hundred
years after it was first articulated, Cronin writes: “Throughout most of this period, sexual selection
remained on the Darwinian sidelines, neglected, distorted or misunderstood. Natural selection
suffered a partial eclipse for almost half a century after Darwin’s death. Sexual selection suffered an
almost total eclipse for almost twice as long.” Id. at 243.
106. See id. at 114 (noting that the “attitude—accepting direct male competition but rejecting
female choice—predominated throughout most of the theory’s history”).
107. A heritable genetic trait that confers a 1% reproductive advantage to an individual will, in
only 265 generations, be present in the entire population. See Owen D. Jones, Time-Shifted Rationality
and the Law of Law’s Leverage: Behavioral Economics Meets Behavioral Biology, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1141,
1165–66 n.80 (2001) (citing ROBERT TRIVERS, SOCIAL EVOLUTION 28–29 (James W. Behnke & Jo
Andrews eds., Benjamin/Cummings Publ’g Co. 1985)). As to the question why these traits should be
expressed in males but not females, when both sexes share the same genetic endowment save for
those genes on the Y chromosome, the answer in all likelihood stems from differential activation of
genes. “The great majority of sex differences . . . are not sex linked, but sex limited. Sex limitation is
the result of differential expression (activation) of genes which are present in both sexes.” LAURA
MEALEY, SEX DIFFERENCES: DEVELOPMENTAL AND EVOLUTIONARY STRATEGIES 13 (2000) (emphasis in
original).
108. DARWIN, supra note 1, at 222.
109. Though Darwin mentioned both weapons and charms, some feminist biologists have noted
that intersexual selection resulting from female preference for certain male traits was for many
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“intersexual competition.” Male-male competition for females that takes the
form of fighting, dominance, and status-seeking is referred to as intrasexual
competition. In contrast, selection that is more easily understood in the context
of female preference for certain male characteristics is known as intersexual
111
selection.
Both intersexual and intrasexual selection pressures can result in evolution
of fancy “dress” in animals. Where males and females differ in ornamentation or
coloring, the male of the species is the “fancier” sex in the overwhelming
112
majority of cases. Evolutionary analysis suggests that this is because in most
113
species access to females is the major limiting factor in reproductive success.
Physiological differences—and, according to evolutionary psychologists,
cognitive, behavioral and emotional differences—between males and females
114
stem largely from their differing reproductive strategies.

decades ignored or disparaged by evolutionists because it contradicted closely held beliefs about the
extent of female agency. See Andreas Paul, Sexual Selection and Mate Choice, 23 INT’L J. PRIMATOLOGY
877, 878 (2002); Patricia Adair Gowaty, Sexual Natures: How Feminism Changed Evolutionary Biology, 28
SIGNS: J. WOMEN CULTURE & SOC. 901, 908–12 (2003).
110. Note that male competition and female choosiness are the usual patterns among most
species, and especially among mammals, though there are exceptions to this rule. See ANDERSSON,
supra note 102, at 10 (“In the minority of species with mainly paternal care, the sex differences in
parental roles can override the effects of anisogamy and lead to a reversal of other aspects of sex
roles and sexual dimorphism.”); id. at 177–82 (describing and explaining sex-role reversal). In
addition, feminist scientists in recent years have made clear that, even in species in which this
general rule prevails, the reality is much more complex and nuanced than previously imagined. See
Patricia Adair Gowaty et al., Indiscriminate Females and Choosy Males: Within- and Between-Species
Variation in Drosophila, 57 EVOLUTION 2037 (2003); Patricia Adair Gowaty et al., Male House Mice
Produce Fewer Offspring with Lower Viability and Poorer Performance When Mated with Females They Do
Not Prefer, 65 ANIMAL BEHAV. 95 (2003). This recent work suggests that mate selection is a dialectic
process with significant choice exercised by both males and females, and with significant fitness
effects demonstrated when that choice is constrained.
111. See MAYR, supra note 100, at 138. In addition, recent scholarship in the field has identified a
third major component of sexual selection: “male-female conflict.” See, e.g., C. Cordero & W.G.
Eberhard, Female Choice of Sexually Antagonistic Male Adaptations: A Critical Review of Some Current
Research, 16 J. EVOLUTIONARY BIOL. 1 (2003); Andrew Sih et al., Path Analysis and the Relative
Importance of Male-Female Conflict, Female Choice and Male-Male Competition in Water Striders, 63
ANIMAL BEHAV. 1079 (2002) (stating that of the three major behavioral mechanisms underlying
sexual selection, that of male-female conflict has been the least studied). According to a recent
literature review, “[i]mportant theoretical and empirical developments have suggested new
interpretations of sexual selection. Some evolutionary phenomena that were previously explained by
mate choice or intrasexual competition, may be better explained by coevolution of males and
females that result [sic] from conflicts of interest between the sexes, in which females evolve to avoid
natural selection costs.” Id. at 1.
112. See MELVIN KONNER, THE TANGLED WING 265 (W.H. Freeman 2d ed. 2002) (“In most species
of birds and mammals, males are at least somewhat larger, more conspicuous, more competitive,
more variable in reproductive success, and less caring toward their offspring than females.”).
113. “In most species, males are the more competitive sex, and females choosier, because
potential rates of reproduction are greater for males than for females. For example, human males
can, in principle, produce offspring at the rate of one every few weeks or months; human females
can, at best, produce offspring every few years.” DOUG JONES, PHYSICAL ATTRACTIVENESS AND THE
THEORY OF SEXUAL SELECTION: RESULTS FROM FIVE POPULATIONS 21 (Univ. of Mich. Museum 1996).
114. Strategy is used here in the biological sense; there is no normative implication. A
reproductive strategy is merely a possible way of passing genes onto the next generation. A
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In biology, “male” and “female” are defined in a very specific manner:
“those individuals we label ‘female’ are individuals that produce relatively
large, nutrient-rich, immobile gametes (sex cells); males are those individuals
116
that produce relatively small, nutrient poor, mobile gametes.” This division
into two distinct gametal types—termed “anisogamy” —has all manner of
repercussions for the organisms that produce them due to the simple
117
definitional fact that “sperm is [relatively] cheap.” Furthermore, among
mammals and other groups that internally gestate their offspring, it is almost
118
invariably the female of the species that does so. This disparity between males
119
and females in the initial parental investment results in pressure for females to
120
be relatively “choosy” and males to be relatively promiscuous. This variance in

successful strategy likewise implies only reproductive success, not moral approval. See Seaman,
supra note 31, at 349 n.61.
115. In contrast, psychologists generally distinguish sex from gender and identify several
individual components of sex and gender that result in a spectrum rather than a simple male-female
binary. These components include chromosomal sex, fetal gonadal sex, fetal hormonal balance, fetal
brain development, assigned gender, gender identity, and pubertal hormones. See MEALEY, supra
note 107, at 11–23 (discussing sex and gender and describing sexologist John Money’s “Eight
Elements of Sex and Gender”).
116. Id. at 47. Not all species reproduce sexually, and of those that do, not all consist of two sexes
that can be defined thus as male and female. Many species reproduce asexually; some reproduce
both asexually and sexually; and some, such as slime molds, are made up of multiple mating types.
See id. However, sexual reproduction and two distinct “male” and “female” mating types is the most
common pattern of reproduction in nature. See DONALD SYMONS, THE EVOLUTION OF HUMAN
SEXUALITY 21 (Oxford University Press, USA 1979) (“[A]mong nonhermaphroditic, many-celled
animals that reproduce sexually there are two and only two sexes, defined on the basis of the sex
cells they produce: a female produces eggs, which are large and carry a reserve of food for the
embryo; a male produces sperm, which are small and possess a taillike organ to enable them to reach
the egg.”). But see ROUGHGARDEN, supra note 16, at 75–105 (arguing that there are multiple
expressions in nature—and often within species—of “maleness” and “femaleness”).
117. Linda Mealey attributes this phrase to anthropologist Donald Symons. She points out that
the phrase is grammatically incorrect—”it should be ‘sperm are cheap.’” MEALEY, supra note 107, at
76.
118. There are a few—very few—exceptions to this rule. “Of all sex-role-reversed species, the
only ones which are viviparous [offspring are born live rather than laying eggs] are seahorses and
pipefish—which have male gestation.” Id. at 77 (citing A. Berglund et al., Reversed Sex Roles and
Parental Energy Investment in Zygotes of Two Pipefish (Syngnathidae) Species, 29 MARINE ECOL.
PROGRESS 209 (1986)) (alteration added).
119. Parental investment refers to energy and resources devoted to offspring. It includes such
components as gametal production, provision of resources to offspring, and protection of offspring.
For female mammals, parental investment also includes gestation and nursing. See Robert L. Trivers,
Parental Investment and Sexual Selection, in SEXUAL SELECTION AND THE DESCENT OF MAN 1871–1971, at
136 (Bernard Campbell ed., 1972).
120. See id. at 136. According to a recent academic text on sex differences in human and
nonhuman animals, “the consequences of anisogamy—that males are typically more mobile, have a
higher sex drive, and seek multiple partners—are that attracting a sexual partner for a female is a
fairly easy task. (As we all know, males of our own species are not infrequently known to be willing
to even pay for sexual access.) This circumstance allows females an element of choosiness when it
comes to purely sexual partnering.” MEALEY, supra note 107, at 118. The descriptors “coy” and
“eager” have often been used to describe the behaviors of females and males, respectively. See, e.g.,
DARWIN, DESCENT OF MAN, supra note 99, at 225 (“The female, on the other hand, with the rarest
exceptions, is less eager than the male . . . she generally ‘requires to be courted;’ she is coy, and may
often be seen endeavouring for a long time to escape from the male.” (quoting HUNTER, ESSAYS AND
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optimal reproductive strategy between males and females creates a dynamic by
which males will tend to compete for scarce access to female reproductive
partners, and by which females will discriminate among prospective males for
121
sperm to fertilize her expensive eggs.
This basic evolutionary pattern sets up a dynamic by which males may
come to possess weaponry, status badges, bright coloration, lovely song,
dramatic tail feathers, combs, and wattles. All of these reveal competition
among males for access to females. Where such competition tends toward a
male-male struggle in which the victor “gets the girl,” intrasexual competition
predominates and favors development of such “masculine” characteristics as
122
extreme size and aggression, status badges, and weaponry such as tusks,
horns, or fangs. Alternatively, the competition may emphasize female choice
123
rather than male power: In “lekking” species, for example, males gather in a
large group—a “lek”—to display their charms, and females choose the males
124
with which to mate.
OBSERVATIONS 194 (Owen ed., 1961)); RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE 140–65 (Oxford
University Press, USA 1st ed. 1986) (discussing intersexual and intrasexual competition using game
theory, and labeling female reproductive strategies “coy” and “fast”). As Helena Cronin has pointed
out, however accurate as a general matter these terms may be, they are quite loaded. She notes that
“it has become standard to talk of ‘coy females (and ‘eager males’),” and that she “can’t resist
wondering what words would be used if the sex-roles were reversed. Would a (male) investor or
business executive be called coy for not rushing headlong into the first option? If males were choosy
about mates, would they be ‘coy’—or discriminating, judicious, responsible, prudent, discerning?
(And, by the way, would females be ‘eager’—or would they be wonton, frivolous, wayward,
brazen?).” CRONIN, supra note 103, at 248.
121. This summary is an oversimplified account of evolutionary theory and data that omits
much detail and complexity, including exceptions to this general account, such as “sex role
reversals,” that are usually traced to certain environmental conditions. See, e.g., KONNER, supra note
105 at 264–67. However, as Professor Konner states, “even the exceptions prove the rule,” id. at 264,
and “species with partly reversed sex roles illuminate the evolutionary process and prove that
gender as we know it is not irrevocably set in the genes. But important as they are for theory, they
are exceptions.” Id. at 265.
122. Status badges are traits that “can serve as signals of potential aggression, so individuals
(male or female) typically refrain from challenging others whose signals indicate they would be
likely to accept the challenge and triumph in a physical contest.” MEALEY, supra note 107, at 96–98
(citing S. Rohwer & P.W. Ewald, The Cost of Dominance and Advantage of Subordination in a Badge
Signaling System, 35 EVOLUTION 441 (1981); S.A. Adamo & R.T. Hanlon, Do Cuttlefish (Cephalopoda)
Signal Their Intentions to Conspecifics During Agonistic Encounters?, 52 ANIMAL BEHAV. 73 (1996); T.
Jarvi & M. Bakken, The Function of the Variation in the Breast Stripe of the Great Tit (Parus Major), 32
ANIMAL BEHAV. 590 (1984); Ligon et al., Male-Male Competition, Ornamentation and the Role of
Testosterone in Sexual Selection in Red Jungle Fowl, 40 ANIMAL BEHAV. 367 (1990); A.P. Moller, Variation
in Badge Size in Male House Sparrows Passer Domesticus: Evidence for Status Signalling, 37 ANIMAL
BEHAV. 1637 (1987); A. P. Moller, Sexual Behavior is Related to Badge Size in the House Sparrow Passer
Domesticus, 27 BEHAV. ECOL. & SOCIOBIOL. 23 (1990); P. J. Moore et al., Odour Conveys Status on
Cockroaches, 389 NATURE 25 (1997)).
123. Lekking species are those “in which males congregate and display on particular patches of
ground, ground that is used only for this purpose—not for food or cover or anything else. The
females visit the males there and apparently look them over . . . the lek is a meeting place for
mating.” CRONIN, supra note 103, at 222.
124. “By lekking, [males] simply advertise their ‘quality’—how well they have survived, what
great risks they can take by displaying, how strong their sons might be . . . . Females visit the lek,
assess male quality, and choose a male.” BOBBI S. LOW, WHY SEX MATTERS: A DARWINIAN LOOK AT
HUMAN BEHAVIOR 50 (Princeton Univ. Press 2000) (alteration added).
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Where competition takes the latter form—which tends to emphasize female
choice—males are most likely to possess the fanciest dress, such as the peacock’s
125
tail. Though evolutionary biologists long professed to be baffled by the
seemingly irrational preferences of females that might lead to a male trait such
126
as the peacock’s tail, in recent years there has been an upsurge of interest
127
among scientists in the area of female choice. Several theories have been

125. Though on the surface it might seem reasonably accurate to attribute most weaponry to
male-male competition and most fancy ornament to female choice, in fact the relationship is much
more complex and has only recently begun to be studied in detail by animal behaviorists. In fact, it is
very difficult to tease apart the various sexual selection pressures on sexually dimorphic traits. Some
studies of these traits have revealed simultaneous—at times conflicting—pressures resulting from
intrasexual and intersexual competition upon the same trait. See Sih et al., supra note 111 (finding
that male size in the stream-dwelling water strider was simultaneously affected by all three
mechanisms of male-male competition, female choice, and male-female conflict); Cordero &
Eberhard, supra note 111 (arguing that female choice, in addition to male-female conflict, could
simultaneously contribute to the evolution of male traits that had been attributed solely to malefemale conflict). In addition, there is a dialectical quality by which “intersexual selection pressures
imposed by female choice on the display of males can set up further intrasexual selection pressures
of males competing with other males and vice versa.” MEALEY, supra note 107, at 123 (citations
omitted) (emphasis in original). Moreover, interesting research has recently shown that male
aggressive traits (that would figure more prominently in male-male competitive selection) may be
co-opted to become courtship display traits important in female choice selection. See Gerald Borgia &
Seth William Coleman, Co-option of Male Courtship Signals from Aggressive Display in Bowerbirds, 267
PROC. R. SOC. LONDON 1735 (2000).
126. Darwin believed that females of species such as peafowl preferred beauty out of an aesthetic
sense similar to that which led humans to admire art and music. He wrote that “a great number of
male animals . . . have been rendered beautiful for beauty’s sake,” because such “beauty may serve
as a charm for the female, and for no other purpose.” DARWIN, SEXUAL SELECTION, supra note 99, at
92, 152–53 (quoted in CRONIN, supra note 103). Cronin states that Darwin failed to “face up to the
most serious aspect of this irrationality: the fact that the choice is for costly and often grossly
extravagant characteristics.” CRONIN, supra note 103. She notes that “[t]o require the male to deck
himself out in gaudy colours, or sport a long tail, or sing and dance for hours on end is to impose a
heavy burden on him.” Id. at 185. Male traits such as this one are viewed as a liability in terms of
purely natural selection because they may attract predators as well as fertile females and may
hamper the animal’s ability to escape. In addition, they require an enormous amount of energy to
maintain and carry around. Evolutionists seemed either to view such silly choices as simply an
animal manifestation of the stereotypical female focus on decoration instead of substance, or to reject
the idea of sexual selection altogether and rely on alternative explanations for the male ornaments.
See id. at 133–46 (summarizing history of sexual selection debate as related to proposals made to
explain coloration without selection). It has been found, however, that “[i]n the wild, peacocks that
had been successful at attracting mates were more likely to be alive the following year than cocks
that had been unsuccessful,” demonstrating that “[s]omehow, females do make accurate choices”
about male health and vigor. MEALEY, supra note 107, at 123 (alterations added).
127. See Paul, supra note 109, at 878 (“[S]ince the 1970s, the theory of sexual selection and mate
choice has experienced a fulminant revival, with major new theoretical insights and empirical
findings.” (alteration added)). This is likely related to the influx of women into the fields of biology,
primatology, ethology, and related areas. See Griet Vandermassen, Sexual Selection: A Tale of Male
Bias and Feminist Denial, 11 EUR. J. WOMEN’S STUD. 9 (2004); Anne Fausto-Sterling, Patricia Adair
Gowaty, and Marlene Zuk, Evolutionary Psychology and Darwinian Feminism, 23 FEMINIST STUD. 403,
409 (1997) (“Over the last decade and a half, however, ideas about animal sexual behavior and the
evolution of sexual differences have undergone a revolution. During the 1970s women flooded into
the field of animal behavior—especially the study of primates.”).
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advanced as to why females might exhibit preferences for such fancy and
128
extravagant accoutrements as the peacock’s tail.
There are several models of mate choice that attempt to explain female
preference for certain male characteristics, most notably the extreme and costly
ornaments such as the peacock’s tail. The “runaway process” (or “sexy sons”)
model posits that “females gain indirect genetic benefits by choosing attractive
males, not because they are genetically superior in any way, but because females
with a strong preference for attractive males will have attractive sons and,
ultimately, more grand-offspring than females mating with less attractive
129
males.” There is clearly a circular quality to this model: it does not explain the
original female preference but only how, once assumed, such a preference
would enhance reproductive success. However, there is empirical support for
130
the theory in several studies across a variety of insect and fish species. It is
possible that a male trait that originally is preferred based on a sensory
predisposition that is otherwise unrelated to reproduction could set up a process
of runaway selection that would favor the male ornament simply because other
females are likely to find it attractive and thus mate preferentially with the “sexy
131
sons” of the females who prefer the trait.
In addition to the sexy sons or runaway hypothesis, there are several
versions of the “good genes” hypothesis for female preference for male
ornaments and other showy traits. Common to all of these variations on the
good genes hypothesis is the assumption that the particular trait is an honest
signal for good genes in the male who wears it. The most straightforward of
these theories, and one for which there is growing empirical support, suggests
that the appearance of the ornament directly correlates with good health
132
because, for example, bright colors indicate low parasite load. Several studies
have now shown correlations between bright coloration in birds and low
133
parasite load. In their original study, biologists William Hamilton and Marlene
Zuk tested their hypothesis of an interaction between parasite resistance and

128. See generally ANDERSSON, supra note 102 (containing detailed discussion of possible
mechanisms of competition over mates, including scrambles, endurance rivalry, contests, mate
choice (including Fisherian runaway selection, indicator mechanisms, species recognition, direct
phenotypic benefits, sensory bias, and mating synchronization and stimulation), and sperm
competition).
129. Id. at 885. See also RONALD A. FISHER, THE GENETICAL THEORY OF NATURAL SELECTION 146–56
(Dover 2d ed. 1958).
130. See Paul, supra note 109, at 885.
131. See Michael J. Ryan, Sexual Selection and Mate Choice, in BEHAVIORAL ECOLOGY: AN
EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH 181 (J.R. Krebs & N.B. Davies, eds., Blackwell 1997) (noting that sexual
selection of certain male traits “could result from pleiotropic effects, such as sensory adaptations for
predator avoidance or prey detection, which can then affect mating preferences”); see generally
Michael J. Ryan, Sexual Selection, Sensory Systems and Sensory Exploitation, 7 OXFORD SURVEYS
EVOLUTIONARY BIOL. 157 (1990).
132. See William D. Hamilton & Marlene Zuk, Heritable True Fitness and Bright Birds: A Role for
Parasites?, 218 SCI. 384, 384 (1982); see also Gerald S. Wilkinson et al., Male Eye Span in Stalk-Eyed Flies
Indicates Genetic Quality By Meiotic Drive Suppression, 391 NATURE 276, 277–78 (1998).
133. See M. Petrie, Improved Growth and Survival of Offspring of Peacocks with More Elaborate Trains,
371 NATURE 598 (1994); see also JT Manning & M.A. Hartley, Symmetry and Ornamentation are
Correlated in the Peacock’s Train, 42 ANIMAL BEHAV. 1020 (1991).
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male coloration and song complexity and found that the showiest species of
North American birds were those that were most susceptible to parasite
134
infection. They tentatively concluded that these species evolved their showy
traits as a signal to females of individual health and vigor, whereas nonsusceptible species would be less likely to evolve such traits.
A variation on this model is the “handicap theory” of mate choice. This
theory posits that the fancy ornament signals genetic quality and robust health
precisely because of its otherwise detrimental affect on male fitness: Only the
most robust and fit males could manage to survive while supporting such a
useless, energy-demanding appendage that tends to attract predators and
135
hinder escape.
Finally, recent theoretical and empirical work suggests that at least in some
species, both males and females prefer mates who are particularly suited to
136
them individually. Rather than positing a single male or female who possesses
the “best genes” and with whom all opposite sex individuals should choose to
mate if they are able, this model proposes that “good genes” may mean different
things to different individuals. For example, a female might, all else being equal,
choose to mate with the male whose immunological traits most complement
137
hers, or who will allow her offspring the greatest degree of genetic variability.
This last model emphasizes female agency and the role of free female
choice in reproductive success. Recent studies have demonstrated that
constraints on mate choice can have detrimental consequences for the well-being
138
of the female as well as the fecundity of the group. In a series of experiments

134. See Hamilton & Zuk, supra note 132, at 386.
135. See Amotz Zahavi, Mate Selection—A Selection for a Handicap, 53 J. THEORETICAL BIOL. 205
(1975); see also CRONIN, supra note 103, at 195–97 (discussing example of male pelicans that grow
large bumps on their beaks during mating season that make it difficult for them to see; according to
Zahavi, “The point of the exercise is to show off, and to do so reliably. ‘Look how well I can feed
myself, even with this great big bump in front of my eyes!’”). In an anecdote that illustrates the force
as well as the great irony of the handicap theory, it is said that President William Henry Harrison
campaigned against Martin Van Buren by emphasizing his masculinity in contrast to Van Buren,
whom he portrayed as an effeminate dandy in “ruffled shirt and silken hose.” “Harrison won the
election, but on the day William Henry Harrison took the oath of office it was bitter cold. Lest he
appear weak and unmanly, he refused to wear a topcoat and caught pneumonia and died one month
after taking office.” RUBINSTEIN, supra note 4, at 159 (citing M. KIMMEL, MANHOOD IN AMERICA 39
(Free Press 1995)).
136. See Jerram L. Brown, A Theory of Mate Choice Based on Heterozygosity, 8 BEHAV. ECOLOGY 60,
60 (1997) (developing theorical and empirical support for the hypotheses that: “(1) What is best for
one female may not be best for another; (2) even if the ‘best’ male is found, his superiority may be
due to heterozygosity at one or more loci, hence not simply heritable (heterozygosity is not an
allele); (3) mate choice amplifies the chief advantage of sexuality, namely genetic diversification”
and concluding that “a female’s strategy should be to find the alleles that best complement her own
in at least some of her offspring”); Jeanne A. Zeh & David W. Zeh, The Evolution of Polyandry I:
Intragenomic Conflict and Genetic Incompatibilty, 263 PROC. BIOLOGICAL SCI. 1711 (1996) (“present[ing]
the hypothesis that, by mating with more than one male, females can reduce the threat to their
[Reproductive Success] of genetic incompatibility” that arises from genetic conflict at the molecular
level) (alterations added).
137. See Brown, supra note 136, at 62 (discussing the immunological incompatibility theory of
mate choice and the heterozygosity theory of mate choice).
138. See SARAH BLAFFER HRDY, MOTHER NATURE: MATERNAL INSTINCTS AND HOW THEY SHAPE
THE HUMAN SPECIES 41–42 (Pantheon 1st ed. 1999) (discussing the work of evolutionary biologist
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across five different species, evolutionary biologist Patricia Adair Gowaty has
found that females who were able to mate with their preferred male had
139
offspring with increased rates of viability and reproductive success. The same
experiments showed identical results when the sexes were reversed and the
140
males were permitted free choice of mates. Furthermore, these studies
demonstrate that the preferred male is different for different females; there is no
absolute genetic fitness independent of the selecting female. With respect to
sexual selection and sexually dimorphic traits, these studies highlight the
relevance of subtle variations in the “dress” of individuals and the dangers of
uniformity, both genetic and apparent.
A final aspect of animal dress should be noted because it is, perhaps, the
facet that is most analogous to human dress in that it involves behavior that is
decorative, rather than an animal’s purely physiological features. This is the
practice of some animals, most notably the male bowerbird of Australia, to
create decorative displays which females evaluate in order to choose
141
reproductive partners. Male bowerbirds build elaborate structures known as
142
bowers and then attempt to entice females to enter and mate. Many species
decorate their bowers with colorful objects such as berries, feathers, shells, and
other found treasures. In addition, certain species show preferences for specific

Patricia Adair Gowaty and Geneticist William Rice in evaluating the possibilities of “free female
choice”).
139. See generally Cynthia K. Bluhn & Patricia Adair Gowaty, Social Constraints on Female Mate
Preference in Mallards’ Anas Platyrhynchos Decrease Offspring Viability and Mother Productivity, 68
ANIMAL BEHAV. 977 (2004); Lee C. Drickhamer et al., Free Female Mate Choice in House Mice Affects
Reproductive Success and Offspring Viability and Performance, 59 ANIMAL BEHAV. 371 (2000); Patricia
Adair Gowaty et al., Mutual Interest Between the Sexes and Reproductive Success in Drosophilia
Pseudoobscura, 56 EVOLUTION 2437 (2002).
140. See generally Patricia Adair Gowaty et al., Male House Mice Produce Fewer Offspring with Lower
Viability and Poorer Performance When Mated with Females They Do Not Prefer, 65 ANIMAL BEHAV. 95
(2003). This result challenges conventional sexual selection wisdom, which tends to assume that
males of most species do not engage in significant sexual selection of females, and which tends to
ignore variation among females. In other words, Professor Gowaty’s groundbreaking work provides
strong evidence that—at least in the species she has studied—sexual selection is a dialectical process
operating on both males and females. This research suggests that both males and females compete
for and choose their mates.
141. See MEALEY, supra note 107, at 91–92. Mealey remarks upon the strong analogy to human
culture: “In one of the more interesting twists of evolution (perhaps interesting because it is so
blatant in our own species), the males of some species use objects for sexual signaling.” Id. at 91. I
would like to thank Sarah Brosnan for bringing this example to my attention.
142. The bowers are not nests; the females do not lay eggs in the bowers. Rather, the bowers are
used only for courtship displays and mating. Bowerbirds are a “lekking” species, and the male does
not contribute parental care or resources to the female or to the offspring. Information about
bowerbirds is available on a website maintained by Professor Gerald Borgia, an authority on the
birds. See Professor Gerald Borgia, Borgia Lab, University of Maryland, Sexual Selection in
Bowerbirds, http://www.life.umd.edu/biology/borgialab/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2007). Professor
Borgia’s research has demonstrated that the bower serves a protective function for the female in that
a well-constructed bower allows the female to observe the aggressive courtship display of the male
without being herself threatened with coerced mating. See Borgia, supra note 28, at 542. This brings
to mind a quotation about fashion attributed to Sophia Loren: “A woman’s dress should be like a
barbed-wire fence: serving its purpose without obstructing the view.” JAMES B. SIMPSON, SIMPSON’S
CONTEMPORARY QUOTATIONS (1988), available at http://www.bartleby.com/63/42/6042.html (last
visited December 13, 2006).
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colors: the satin bowerbird female favors blue decorations, and males will go to
elaborate lengths, including stealing from other males, to obtain blue objects for
their bowers. This is an example of a sexual dimorphism in a nonhuman animal
whereby one sex—here, the male—deliberately decorates his immediate
environment so as to send certain signals to the other—here, the female—in
143
order to gain reproductive advantage.
The themes of the animal dress literature and of sexual selection theory
more generally thus emerge as centered around social signaling (i.e.
communication), competition, power, and status. These themes are remarkably
consistent with those seen in the interdisciplinary scholarship on human dress,
discussed in the next section.
B. Adding a Layer: Human Dress
Clothing and other additions to, or modifications of, the human body have
drawn interest from scholars in many fields, including sociology, psychology,
144
philosophy, art history, and anthropology.
Many of the recent
interdisciplinary treatments of dress reveal intriguing similarities to the sexual
selection literature. In particular, human dress has clear gender associations and
145
is almost always sexually “dimorphic” in some respects. Most obviously, the
signaling functions of dress are closely analogous to the functions of animal
146
dress as evolutionary adaptations. On the other hand, dress in contemporary

143. This language, which implies conscious motivation, is used as a convenience but is
sometimes cause for confusion. The behaviors evolve because they tend to further reproductive
success and therefore are differentially passed along; however, there is not necessarily any
motivation—conscious or otherwise—on the part of individuals to gain reproductive advantage. See,
e.g., RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE 50 (Oxford Univ. Press, USA 1st ed. 1986) (“In practice it
is usually convenient, as an approximation, to regard the individual body as an agent ‘trying’ to
increase the numbers of all its genes in future generations. I shall use the language of convenience.”);
RICHARD DAWKINS, THE ANCESTOR’S TALE 5 (2004) (“From our human point of view, the emergence
of our remote fish ancestors from water to land was a momentous step, an evolutionary right of
passage . . . . That is not the way it was at the time. Those Devonian fish had a living to earn. They
were not on a mission to evolve, not on a quest towards the distant future.”).
144. See, e.g., Joanne Entwistle & Elizabeth Wilson, Introduction: Body Dressing, in BODY DRESSING,
supra note 3, at 1 (“Interdisciplinarity has gained ground across the humanities and social sciences
and scholars have approached fashion and dress from a number of perspectives that have
challenged the marginal place of fashion within tradition academic scholarship.”); CHARLOTTE
SUTHRELL, UNZIPPING GENDER: SEX, CROSS-DRESSING AND CULTURE (2004) (comparative
ethnographic study of male to female cross-dressing, including deep examination of gender norms
and gender barriers embodied in clothing, in Britain and India); DRESS AND GENDER: MAKING AND
MEANING (Ruth Barnes & Joanne B. Eicher eds., 1992); CAROLINE DALEY, GIRLS & WOMEN, MEN &
BOYS: GENDER IN TARADALE 1886–1930 (Auckland Univ. Press 1999); ANNETTE LYNCH, DRESS,
GENDER AND CULTURAL CHANGE: ASIAN AMERICAN AND AFRICAN AMERICAN RITES OF PASSAGE (Berg
Publishers 1999); RUBINSTEIN, supra note 4; CRANE, supra note 17; BARNARD, supra note 14.
145. See, e.g., CRANE, supra note 17, at 16 (arguing that, although clothing fashions communicate
messages about class hierarchy and social power, “their principal messages are about the ways in
which women and men perceive their gender roles or are expected to perceive them”); BARNARD,
supra note 14, at 112 (noting that, while sex differences in dress are virtually universal, they vary
widely in the particulars of what denotes masculinity and femininity in dress).
146. All of the various “good genes” hypotheses of mate choice necessarily assume that the
character trait preferred by the female in some way signals health, vigor, or other quality beneficial
to reproductive success.
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Western society is characterized by fancy females and plain males, which
seems counter to the prevalent pattern among nonhuman animals. It may be
that this curious feature of modern Western human dress reveals something
important about the interaction between biology and culture in the formation of
human gender roles and differences.
A few preliminary points are in order. First, though variously defined by
different authors and in different academic fields, this article adopts the broad
definition of dress suggested by interdisciplinary scholars Joanne Eicher and
Mary Ellen Roach-Higgins. Combining the related categories of “body
modifications” and “body supplements,” these scholars recognize that “the
dressed person is a gestalt that includes body, all direct modifications of the
body itself, and all three-dimensional supplements added to it.” “Dress,” as
defined by Eicher and Roach-Higgins, includes everything that is left of this
148
package once the body itself is separated out. Thus, it includes, in addition to
clothing, all manner of body modifications and supplements such as deliberately
made scars, tattoos, perfumes, hairstyles, foot coverings, jewelry, and hand-held
149
accessories. While dress is defined as ultimately distinct from the unmodified
body, recognizing that human dress is, at bottom, a gestalt that is in some
fundamental way inseparable from that unadorned body serves to make the
analogy to nonhuman dress that much more apparent.
Second, in evolutionary terms, an adaptation is defined as such largely
150
based on an examination of its function. The prior section analyzed the
function of gender-differentiated dress in nonhuman animals so as to tease apart
the various selection pressures that likely led to the evolution of those dress
differences. This section turns to human dress and the gender norms and signals

147. This general pattern whereby the females tend to be the more highly ornamented and
colorful sex has not always been the rule among humans. For example, during the Renaissance in
Europe and continuing through the reign of Henry IV into the Seventeenth Century, men adopted a
body-revealing and sexualized style of dress that was highly adorned and ornamented. See
RUBINSTEIN, supra note 4, at 156–58 (describing rise of male decorative and sexualized dress during
the Renaissance and Cavalier periods).
148. Eicher & Roach-Higgins, supra note 4, at 13 (emphasis in original). Eicher and RoachHiggins recognize that this separation is somewhat fictive and can only be accomplished through
“mental manipulation.” See id. Some authors distinguish clothing from fashion, with fashion
connoting change, trendiness, and the simultaneous desires to be part of the social whole and to
distinguish one’s individuality. See BARNARD, supra note 14, at 7–24; J.C. FLUGEL, THE PSYCHOLOGY
OF CLOTHES (1930).
149. See id. at 15–16. As this classification system makes clear, humans are almost infinitely
creative when it comes to dress: “Parts of the body that can be modified include hair, skin, nails,
muscular-skeletal system, teeth, and breath.” Id. at 16.
150. Evolutionary biologists generally recognize a feature of an organism as an adaptation when
“it solves an adaptive problem with ‘reliability, efficiency, and economy.’” Leda Cosmides & John
Tooby, Univ. of Cal. Santa Barbara Ctr. for Evolutionary Psychology, Evolutionary Psychology: A
Primer, http://www.psych.ucsb.edu/research/cep/primer.html (quoting GEORGE C. WILLIAMS,
ADAPTATION AND NATURAL SELECTION: A CRITIQUE OF SOME CURRENT EVOLUTIONARY THOUGHT
(Princeton Univ. Press 1966)). Thus, the definition of an adaptation focuses upon the function of the
trait: one cannot determine whether a particular trait solves an adaptive problem unless one
understands the function of the trait—what the trait does in the life of the organism.
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151

that it reflects, perpetuates, and creates. It then examines the function of dress
through the lens of the sexual selection principles outlined above.
Before discussing the cultural overlay of human dress, it is useful to briefly
summarize the contours and extent of evolved sex dimorphism in humans.
Humans are generally said to exhibit relatively little sexual dimorphism in
152
physical appearance and size. Compared to our closest primate relatives,
153
human males and females are very close in size and weight and do not show
large differences in coloration or other physical features, as do gorillas, for
154
example. Many evolutionary biologists conclude that “we are a ‘mildly
polygynous’ species,” which means also “that we are a mostly monogamous
species. Other than in strength we do not exhibit much physical dimorphism
155
(we are monomorphic).”

151. “Fashion and clothing are instrumental in the process of socialization into sexual and
gender roles; they help shape peoples’ ideas of how men and women should look. It is not the case
that fashion and clothing simply reflect an already existing sex and gender identity, but that they are
‘part of the process by which attitudes to and images of both men and women are created and
reproduced.’” BARNARD, supra note 14, at 111 (quoting E. ROUSE, UNDERSTANDING FASHION-89 108
(Blackwell Science 1989)).
152. Dimorphism of the human brain, and in particular the existence of differences in average
cognitive abilities between men and women, is a controversial topic and one that need not be
addressed here. For representative sources on either side of the debate, see KINGSLEY R. BROWNE,
BIOLOGY AT WORK 25–32 (Rutgers Univ. Press 2002); Richard A. Epstein, Gender Is for Nouns, 41
DEPAUL L. REV. 981, 988–89 (1992); CYNTHIA FUCHS EPSTEIN, DECEPTIVE DISTINCTIONS: SEX, GENDER,
AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 52–56 (Yale Univ. Press & Russell Sage Foundation 1988); ANNE FAUSTOSTERLING, SEXING THE BODY 3–5 (2000); CAROL TAVRIS, THE MISMEASURE OF WOMAN 43–56 (Simon &
Schuster 1992).
153. See MEALEY, supra note 107, at 264 (stating that human “[b]ody size dimorphism is small to
moderate . . . (about 10% by height and about 20% by weight)” (alteration added)). It should be
emphasized, however, that size is not a binary characteristic, and there is much overlap between the
sexes. This statistic relates the difference in average size between males and females. Of course, some
women are larger than many or even most men, and some men are smaller than many or even most
women.
154. Gorillas are a “harem” species, in which a single silverback male (recognizable by the silver
fur on his back) has exclusive reproductive access to all fertile females in the group. In contrast,
chimpanzees live in large, multi-male troops and females mate often and with many males. See id.
Among primates, the traits that vary the most depending upon the mating system of the particular
species are body size, relative canine size, and relative testes size. As with body size, relative canine
and testes sizes (relative to body weight of the male) in humans are consistent with the conclusion
that humans are mostly monogamous. See id. at 263–64.
155. Id. at 317. Suppositions about the prevalent human mating pattern are presumed to be
related to the extent and type of sex dimorphism based both on empirical observation and
theoretical models of sexual selection. Empirically, monogamous species are generally
monomorphic, exhibiting little sexual dimorphism. Theoretically, this would be predicted because
monogamy should evolve under ecological and economic conditions wherein “the costs of desertion
are too high (i.e. without the investment of a second parent, the offspring would likely not otherwise
survive) or when the benefits of desertion are too low (i.e. other mating opportunities are unlikely).”
MEALEY, supra note 107, at 156 (citing numerous scientific sources). Under such conditions, “both
sexes should be circumspect in choice of partner, looking not only for ‘good genes’ and
immunocompetence, but indications that the prospective partner will not desert the family unit as
well.” Id. Thus, in monogamous species, “both sexes exercise choice in mateships, relying on mutual
displays of vigor and commitment.” Id. Because the sexual selection pressures are similar upon both
the male and the female, the species is monomorphic.
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But if our unadorned bodies are relatively monomorphic, our adorned
bodies are frequently much less so. Humans are creative and diverse in the ways
156
that we modify our bodies, and in the ways that we do so in a gender-specific
manner. Humans begin with a body and then, like the male bowerbirds of
Australia, proceed to build an elaborate construct on and around that body.
157
Because humans are a highly social species, the construction of that dressed
body takes place within an elaborate fabric of social norms and expectations. It
has also been said that humans are a profoundly symbolic species in that humans
in all societies invest objects and happenings with meaning beyond their most
158
obvious or mundane functions. As such, it should come as little surprise that
dress serves much more than the simple functions of warmth or protection from
the elements. Scholars of dress uniformly assume, to a greater or lesser degree,
159
that dress is a communicative social behavior. Among many social messages
160
that dress communicates, sex and gender are especially salient. “All cultures
will use clothing, if not fashion, to distinguish male from female, most will use it
to mark the difference between secular and religious classes, and some will use
161
it to mark membership of different families.” Thus, it appears that gender
distinction may be the most universal and salient characteristic marked by
162
human dress.

156. I use the word gender here, rather than sex, because dress norms in many cultures are not
binary.
157. E.g., id. at 265.
158. See TERRANCE W. DEACON, THE SYMBOLIC SPECIES: THE CO-EVOLUTION OF LANGUAGE AND
THE BRAIN 436 (Norton 1997) (arguing that, because of brain evolution spurred by the development
of the symbolic system of language, humans as a species “are not just a species that uses symbols . . .
the symbolic urge has infected us, and now by virtue of the irresistible urge it has instilled in us to
turn everything we encounter and everyone we meet into symbols . . . .”).
159. Some have gone so far as to argue that dress is itself a language, see LURIE, supra note 13;
others view dress as highly analogous to language in many respects, see ROLAND BARTHES, THE
LANGUAGE OF FASHION (Andy Stafford trans., Berg Publishers Eng. ed. 2005); BARNARD, supra note
14 (This idea is inherent in the title of the book, Fashion as Communication.).
160. There has been much discussion in the legal, sociological, and feminist literature of the
proper meanings of the terms sex and gender. See, e.g., JOHN MONEY & ANKE EHRHART, MAN &
WOMAN, BOY & GIRL: THE DIFFERENTIATION OF DIMORPHISM OF GENDER IDENTITY FROM CONCEPTION
TO MATURITY (The Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1973) (distinguishing sex from gender); ANNE
FAUSTO-STERLING, SEXING THE BODY: GENDER POLITICS AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF SEXUALITY 3–5
(Basic Books New Ed. ed. 2000) (discussing the sex/gender dichotomy); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON,
SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 182 (Yale Univ. Press
1979) (discussing the dual meanings of the word sex “to refer both to gender status (as in ‘the female
sex’) and to the activity of intercourse (as in ‘to have sex’)”; Epstein, supra note 152 (arguing that “sex
discrimination” as prohibited by Title VII is discrimination on the basis of physical sex, not gender;
Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the
Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 12 (1995) (arguing that “gender” is more
appropriately used as an adjective, describing “masculine” or “feminine”). As discussed supra note
35, I use the word “sex” to refer to biological maleness or femaleness, and “gender” to refer to social
conventions regarding masculinity and femininity. In addition, note that the use of the word “sex”
in the text accompanying this note conveys both meanings noted by Professor MacKinnon.
161. BARNARD, supra note 14, at 58.
162. An early writer stated that “[t]he great bifurcation of dress is sexual.” See Joanne B. Eicher,
Dress, Gender and the Public Display of Skin, in BODY DRESSING, supra note 3, at 247 (quoting ERNEST
CRAWLEY, DRESS, DRINKS, AND DRUMS (Methuen & Co. Ltd. 1931)) (alteration added).

14__SEAMAN.DOC

2/8/2007 2:08 PM

THE PEAHEN’S TALE

455

Three theories regarding the origin and function of dress were developed
in the nineteenth century: the modesty theory, the protection theory, and the
163
adornment theory. Contemporary theorists have elaborated upon these basic
categories to suggest up to thirteen distinct possible functions of clothing:
protection, modesty and concealment, immodesty and attraction,
communication, individualistic expression, social worth or status, definition of
social role, economic worth or status, political symbol, magico-religious
164
condition, social rituals, and recreation.
165
As noted previously, protection is unlikely to have been the original
impetus for human dress and “variation within cultures and between different
cultures as to what constitutes protection caution against seeing protection as
166
the prime function of clothing.”
Furthermore, though history contains
examples of distinctions in protective clothing based upon perceived biological
167
differences between the sexes, it is unlikely that current gender-differentiated
168
dress codes would or could be defended based upon such a rationale.
The second major category of dress function is encompassed by the
modesty theory. “Until quite recently . . . it was almost universally agreed that
the primal and fundamental reason for wearing clothes was modesty . . . . For
those who accepted the literal truth of the Genesis story, there was no question
169
about it.” Inherent in this theory is “the idea that certain body parts are
170
indecent or shameful and should be covered so that they cannot be seen.”
However, there is a mirror image to the modesty story: attraction or seduction.
Another theory of the origin and function of dress suggests that “the motive for
wearing clothes is precisely immodesty or exhibitionism,” and that the purpose

163. See RUBINSTEIN, supra note 4, at 20; BARNARD, supra note 14, at 48.
164. See id. at 48–67.
165. See supra note 10.
166. BARNARD, supra note 14, at 50. Notwithstanding this apparent consensus on the part of dress
theorists, some clothing quite obviously serves a protective function. In addition, when the concept
of protection is expanded to encompass spiritual, religious, or magical beliefs, then many dress items
such as amulets and good luck charms that are worn to ward off evil or to bring the wearer luck
might be said to fall under the function of protection. See J.C. FLUGEL, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CLOTHES
71 (The Hogarth Press Ltd. 1930). Rubinstein classifies such items of dress under the category of
adornment. See RUBINSTEIN, supra note 4, at 29–33 (noting that some items that today are considered
adornment originated as “amulets believed to help the wearer master fears and anxieties relating to
the supernatural world as well as those relating to the natural world, such as natural disasters,
darkness, illness, and death”).
167. A highly ironic example was the corset of the early Victorian era, which was thought
medically necessary but actually caused significant physical harm to its wearers. “Ladies’ ‘frames,’ it
was believed, were extremely delicate; their muscles could not hold them up without assistance.”
LURIE, supra note 13, at 217.
168. Cf. Int’l Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991) (holding that employer’s
policy that prohibited fertile women from working in certain factory jobs that might expose potential
offspring to lead constituted impermissible sex discrimination).
169. RUBINSTEIN, supra note 4, at 20 (quoting JAMES LAVER, MODESTY IN DRESS 9–11 (Heinemann
1969)).
170. BARNARD, supra note 14, at 51.
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of clothing is “to attract attention to the body rather than to deflect or repel that
171
attention.”
Social norms regarding both the modesty and seduction functions of dress
are and have historically been highly gender-stratified and thus are of particular
interest here. With respect to modesty, though the religious exhortation to mask
172
the signs of sexuality originally applied only to men, over time it came to be
applied to women as well. Eventually, as with fundamentalist Islam and
Orthodox Judaism, some religiously-based rules required women to remain
almost completely covered from head to foot. The injunction that women cover
their bodies was based on women’s “ability to seduce,” which “would lead men
173
to stray from the spiritual.”
In addition to highly sex-specific expectations concerning how much—and
174
which—skin may appropriately be revealed in public, the term “modesty”
itself carries different substantive connotations based on the sex of the
individual to which it is applied. For women in societies in which gendered
expectations require them to cover certain body parts so as not to appear
seductive to men, “modesty entails concealing the body and denying sexual
allure, encouraging sexual inhibition.” In contrast, “[m]en offend modesty by
175
‘swagger,’ an attempt at self-aggrandizement.” Applied to men, the concept of
modesty strongly implies self-restraint. In the religious context, such male selfrestraint entailed a denial of worldly passions and devotion to the Church and
to God. Applied to women, the concept of modesty implied self-restraint of a
different sort: refraining from exposure of the body or suggestion of its
176
seductive nature.
The virtue of self-restraint in men gained particular traction in the United
177
States during the second half of the nineteenth century. In terms of fashion,
this was a turning point after which “many well-to-do men rejected the
sumptuous, body-hugging style, the velvet coat, breeches, perfume, and lace,
178
and adopted a matched suit consisting of a coat, waistcoat, and trousers.” Male
“gentlemen’s clothing” in England by the end of the nineteenth century “was
designed to represent mastery over one’s feelings and to demonstrate
rationality, the state of making decisions on the basis of calculation,

171. Id. at 53; see also RUBINSTEIN, supra note 4, at 135–68 (discussing historic and contemporary
“seductive images” in dress). Ironically, research has shown that covering parts of the body tends to
eroticize those areas. It may be that in cultures in which body covering is not practiced, this
supposed “danger” of the female body to seduce is lessened. See LURIE, supra note 13, at 212–14.
172. This was because, according to Saint Augustine, only in men are the signs of sexual arousal
physically manifested in an obvious way. See RUBINSTEIN, supra note 4, at 21.
173. Id.
174. There is enormous variation among different cultures regarding this social norm, and in
some there is no such requirement for women to cover certain body parts. See id. at 20–22.
175. Id. at 22.
176. See LAVER, supra note 169.
177. “The doctrine of self-restraint [for men] was espoused from the pulpit, in the medical press,
and on the lecture circuit. Writers of advice manuals suggested that, in controlling sexual desires, a
man’s energy would be harnessed to productive activity.” Id. at 160 (citations omitted).
178. Id. at 159.
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179

organization, abstract rules, and procedures.” This style became the prototype
180
for the modern navy or charcoal gray business suit, which is widely viewed as
181
projecting this image of (male) self-restraint.
A related theme that is represented by the dark-colored business suit—and
182
also mirrored in both the evolutionary literature and the gender performance
183
literature —concerns the tension between individuality and social conformity.
“Dress serves as a sign that the individual belongs to a certain group, but
simultaneously differentiates the same individual from all others: it includes
184
and excludes.” Certain types and styles of clothing emphasize individuality,
while others emphasize conformity. As one might imagine, the archetype of
conformity-emphasizing clothing is the uniform, for which lack of individual
identity is embodied in the very word that names the category of dress. This is
most clearly seen in the prototypical male business suit, often described as a
185
type of uniform.
Like the evolutionary explanation of fancy dress in animals, the scholarly
analysis of human dress tends to center around the ideas of communication,
186
control, hierarchy, status, and sex- and gender-signaling. Thus, this literature
adds a layer of complexity that is largely consistent with the ways in which
many biologists view the functions of animal dress. In the next Part, I turn to the
question of what lessons and insights might flow from the foregoing biological
and sociological analysis of nonhuman and human dress.

179. Id. at 45.
180. See id.
181. There are echoes of this theme in the law and economics literature on signaling. For
example, Eric Posner’s recent work relies heavily on an understanding of signaling cooperation and
self-control (what he calls “discount rate”). See generally ERIC POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS
(Harvard Univ. Press New Ed. ed. 2002). If an important role of signaling is to allow people correctly
to distinguish cooperators from cheaters so as to decide with whom to cooperate, then the important
trait that must be signaled is self-restraint—i.e., that one “care[s] about future games relative to
present gains” and is willing to forego short-term gains from selfish behavior in order to reap the
long-term rewards of cooperative behavior. See Eric A. Posner, Symbols, Signals, and Social Norms in
Politics and the Law, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. (1998). Because this type of signaling would be important in a
business context, the understanding of the male business suit as a symbol (signal) of self-restraint
converges interestingly with Posner’s theory.
182. For example, some biologists view distinctive coloration and ornament in animals as a
signal of conspecificity (animals of the same species) and therefore as a means of avoiding mating
with non-specifics (animals of other species). See CRONIN, supra note 103, at 129–31.
183. See KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS xi (Random
House 2006) (“I recognize the value of assimilation, which is often necessary to fluid social
interaction, to peaceful coexistence, and even to the dialogue through which difference is valued. For
that reason, this is no simply screed against conformity. What I urge here is that we approach the
renaissance of assimilation in this country critically.”).
184. DRESS AND GENDER, supra note 4, at 1.
185. Dissenting from a decision invalidating an employee dress code that required women in
certain positions to wear uniforms but allowed men to wear “business attire,” a Seventh Circuit
judge argued that the majority opinion “ignore[d] the fact of life that men’s customary business
attire has never really advanced beyond the status of being a uniform.” Carroll v. Talman Fed. Sav.
& Loan Ass’n of Chi., 604 F.2d 1028, 1034 (7th Cir. 1979) (Pell, J., dissenting).
186. That is, signals both about sexual availability and modesty and about gender identity.
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IV. IF THE SHOE FITS: SEXUAL SELECTION, SEX-BASED DRESS RULES,
AND SEX DISCRIMINATION
The foregoing discussion reveals two predominant themes that emerge
quite vividly in the sexual selection literature, the appearance code case law, and
the sociological scholarship on human dress. The first theme concerns sexual
attraction and mating behavior. As evolutionary theory and research reveal,
differences in animal dress are, in the broadest sense, a result of sexual
187
selection. This means that they are ultimately driven by sexual attraction and
mating behavior. Likewise, a prominent strand of concern in the appearance
code cases is whether a particular sex-specific requirement seems to be based on
stereotypes about female sexual attractiveness. Finally, interdisciplinary
scholarship on human fashion and dress demonstrates that among the primary
functions of human dress are gender expression, modesty, and seduction.
The second major theme that runs through all three categories of materials
is that of status and power. The most highly ornamented males are found in
species in which females have the greatest degree of sexual choice and power in
the mating dance; that is, the degree of sexual dimorphism in animals is closely
188
related to questions of status and power. In the case law involving workplace
dress and grooming, courts have invalidated sex-differentiated uniform policies
because of the perception that such rules signaled power and status differences
189
that were not justified by the relative positions of the employees in question.
Similarly, scholarship on human dress has long revealed the role of clothing in
190
creating, reflecting, and enforcing power and status differences.

187. The quote from Charles Darwin in ORIGIN OF SPECIES, supra note 1, with which this Article
began remains an accurate statement of the understanding of sexual selection and sex differences:
“when the males and females of any animal have the same general habits of life, but differ in
structure, colour, or ornament, such differences have been mainly caused by sexual selection.”
188. See MATT RIDLEY, THE RED QUEEN: SEX AND THE EVOLUTION OF HUMAN NATURE 137
(Macmillan Publ’g Co. 1st Am. Ed. ed. 1994) (“Where males gather on communal display arenas, a
male’s success owes more to his ability to dance and strut than to his ability to fight other males”)
(citing J. Hoglund & J.G.M. Robertson, Female Preferences, Male Decision Rules and the Evolution of Leks
in the Great Snipe, Gallinago Media, 40 ANIMAL BEHAV. 15 (1990)); EDWARD O. WILSON, SOCIOBIOLOGY:
THE NEW SYNTHESIS 331–32 (Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press 2000) (“The most complicated
and spectacular lek systems occur in birds,” and “[t]he males belonging to species on this list [of ten
families of lekking species of birds] are among the most colorful of the bird world. The brilliant red
cock of the rock, for example, is easily the most spectacular cotingid, and the birds of paradise are
justly considered the most beautiful of all birds.” (alterations added)).
189. See Carroll, 604 F.2d at 1028 (majority opinion); O’Donnell v. Burlington Coat Factory
Warehouse, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 263 (S.D. Ohio 1987); EEOC v. Clayton Fed. Sav. & Loan Assoc., 1981
WL 152 (E.D. Mo. 1981).
190. See, e.g., Entwistle & Wilson, Introduction: Body Dressing, in BODY DRESSING, supra note 3, at 4
(“[D]ress and fashion mark out particular kinds of bodies, drawing distinctions in terms of class and
status, gender, age, sub-cultural affiliations that would otherwise not be so visible or significant.”
(alteration added)); Kate Soper, Dress Needs: Reflections on the Clothed Body, Selfhood and Consumption,
in BODY DRESSING, supra note 3, at 21 (“Nor should we forget the extent to which restrictions on
human dress are used to distinguish and police social and sexual hierarchies . . . one , very insidious,
way of exercising power over others is by means of control over their mode of dress”); RUBINSTEIN,
supra note 4, at 69–99 (discussing the images of power and of authority reflected and reinforced by
certain modes of dress); LURIE, supra note 13, at 115–53 (discussing the role of clothing in reflecting
status).
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In this Part, I argue that these intuitive concerns on the part of courts are
valid and that an examination of animal dress differences supports the
importance of these two major rhetorical strands in the case law. Indeed, the
biological literature suggests that these two themes might actually be two sides
of the same coin, an insight which has important implications when considering
employer policies that mandate female ornamentation. While sexual
attractiveness and status signals are not the only relevant considerations, at the
very least those employer grooming codes that reflect stereotypes either of
attractiveness and sexuality or of power and status should be viewed as sex
191
discrimination in violation of Title VII. Furthermore, the animal dress analogy
suggests that the categories of dress codes that implicate these two concerns are
much broader than courts have usually found. Thus, for example, under the
analysis presented here the makeup requirement in Jespersen should be
invalidated.
Furthermore, the sexual selection literature teaches that sex differences in
appearance are anything but trivial. Though courts and employers tend to view
192
clothing, makeup, and hair rules as de minimus, both sexual selection theory
and the interdisciplinary work on human dress demonstrate not only that sex
dimorphisms are shaped by—and in turn shape—relations between the sexes
but also that the implication of frivolity itself reflects a negative gender-linked
stereotype.
A. Sexual Dimorphism, Dress, and the Triviality Question
Addressing first the latter point, social science and humanities scholarship
on human dress teaches that dress is anything but insignificant, both on an
193
individual and a cultural level. Likewise, evolutionary biology makes clear

191. Thus, the analysis here is silent about the treatment of transgendered individuals,
discrimination based on sexual orientation, and the hair length rules as applied to male employees.
It may well be (and I would argue) that the sex-based differential treatment and sex stereotyping
evidenced by the employer practices in those contexts constitutes sex discrimination under Title VII.
See Samuel A. Marcosson, Harassment on the Basis of Sexual Orientation: A Claim of Sex Discrimination,
81 GEO. L. J. 1 (1992). My claim here is more specific and more modest.
192. See, e.g., Tavora v. N.Y. Mercantile Exch., 101 F.3d 907, 907 (2d Cir. 1996) (per curiam)
(summarizing federal appellate case law on hair length policies and stating that a major rationale
supporting the decisions is “that such employment policies have only a de minimus effect”); Knott v.
Mo. Pac. R.R Co., 527 F.2d 1249, 1252 (8th Cir. 1975) (holding that where employer-mandated
appearance rules “are reasonable and are imposed in an evenhanded manner on all employees,
slight differences in the appearance requirements for males and females have only a negligible effect
on employment opportunities”); Boyce v. Gen. Ry. Signal Co., 2004 WL 1574023 (W.D.N.Y. 2004)
(“[E]very . . . federal court of appeals that has considered the issue of male hair-length policies has
upheld such policy, finding either that the policy did not conflict with the statutory goal of equal
employment or that it had only a de minimus effect on employment opportunities.”); Matter of
Gladstone (Catherwood), 36 A.D. 2d 204, 206 (N.Y. 3d Dept. 1971), aff’d, 30 N.Y. 2d 576 (1972) (“The
employer did not have to change the rules to conform to the particular whim of this claimant, and a
failure to do so did not violate his rights to privacy and free expression.”). See also Bartlett, supra note
34, at 2556–57.
193. See generally RUBINSTEIN, supra note 4; LURIE, supra note 13; BARTHES, supra note 159, at 7
(describing dress as a “system [that] is essentially defined by normative links which justify, oblige,
prohibit, tolerate, in a word control the arrangement of garments on a concrete wearer who is
identified in their social and historical place: it is a value” (alteration added)).
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that sexual dimorphisms in coloration and ornament come about mainly
through sexual selection, and that such features play an enormous role in animal
194
behavior and social systems. Yet many courts continue to treat clothing, hair,
195
and makeup as if they are trivial. Such treatment mirrors the cultural
stereotype that interests in fashion and appearance are superficial and non196
serious, and that these are mainly female concerns. Indeed, the Seventh Circuit
in Carroll viewed the employer’s argument that uniforms were necessary to
prevent women from indulging in fashion excesses and competition to imply a
197
demeaning sex-based stereotype.
Many recognize the importance of dress not only as a method of individual
and cultural expression but also as a kind of language that triggers conscious
198
and unconscious associations on the parts of both wearer and viewer. In Price
Waterhouse, Ann Hopkins was not passed over for promotion because she
199
violated an explicit dress code. Insofar as dress played a role in the case, it was
as a suggestion of what she might do to increase her chances of making partner
the following year. As the partner charged with explaining to Hopkins why she
had been passed over told her, she might fare better the next time around if only
she would “dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and
200
wear jewelry.” The Supreme Court took this as evidence that Hopkins was
subjected to sex stereotyping and that the adverse employment action was
because of her sex and not, as the employer argued, based on a gender-neutral
201
standard requiring good interpersonal skills. As the Court wryly noted, it does
not require expertise in psychology “to know that, if an employee’s flawed
‘interpersonal skills’ can be corrected by a soft-hued suit or a new shade of
lipstick, perhaps it is the employee’s sex and not her interpersonal skills that has
202
drawn the criticism.”
This is a very telling statement by the Court. The partner presumably gave
Hopkins this advice because he understood on some level that dress is
194. See discussion supra Part III.A.
195. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 192.
196. See Entwistle & Wilson, supra note 190, at 15 (describing philosophy’s “repudiation of the
body as the intellectual form of its repudiation of the feminine,” and noting that “[t]his is a stance
which also lends itself to a more general cultural process of gender stereotyping and masculine
disassociation in Western culture, according to which it is women who are the vainer sex and the
more concerned with what they wear while men are largely indifferent to questions of attire”
(alteration added)).
197. See Carroll, 604 F.2d at 1033 (“What is offensive is the compulsion to wear employeridentified uniforms and the assumption on which the employer openly admits that rule is based:
that women cannot be expected to exercise good judgment in choosing business apparel, whereas
men can.”).
198. See RUBINSTEIN, supra note 4; LURIE, supra note 13; BARTHES, supra note 159; BARNARD, supra
note 14; ANNE HOLLANDER, SEEING THROUGH CLOTHES (Univ. of Cal. Press Reprint ed. 1993); BODY
DRESSING, supra note 3.
199. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
200. Id. at 235.
201. The defendant argued, and there was some evidence in the record tending to show, that
Hopkins was somewhat lacking in this area. The Court viewed the evidence as sufficient to show
that, whether she was “nice” or not, such a requirement was not equally imposed upon men being
considered for partnership. See id. at 256.
202. Id.
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relevant—in an empirical, rather than legal, sense—to the way in which an
individual is viewed by others in a particular social context. He believed that if
she presented an outward appearance of femininity, she might counter the
203
negative impression among some partners of her “macho” behavior. The
evolutionary and human dress literatures strongly bear out this intuition on the
part of the Court and the Price Waterhouse partner; in addition, social
psychology research demonstrates the very strong unconscious impact social
204
categorization can have upon both self-assessment and assessment by others.
With respect to the scientific understanding of sex differences in dress in
nonhuman animals, it is quite clear that these are not trivial or they would not
have evolved. Male peacocks have the tails that they do because peahens,
whatever their reasons, prefer to mate with males that have large, beautiful,
colorful, magnificent tails. We might think that the peahens are silly for having
such a preference, but this underestimates peahens in the extreme, and imposes
human sex stereotypes upon them as well. Recent sexual selection research
demonstrates empirically that the females’ preferences are neither silly nor
205
arbitrary; rather, they tend to correlate with better reproductive outcomes.
Whether because feather coloration signals low parasite load, or because it
otherwise signals male fitness, it is simply not a de minimus consideration in
206
biological terms. In short, animals take notice of dress differences and mold
their behaviors in response to them.
Likewise, the interdisciplinary social science scholarship on human dress
reveals that the ways humans in any culture clothe, adorn, and modify their
207
bodies are anything but trivial. In the first place, both body adornment and
gender differences in dress are, by all accounts, universal among human beings.
Though there are vast differences across cultures in the manner and extent of
dress and sex differences therein, human societies without exception do expect
their members to dress and to do so in accordance with specific gender norms.
Dress is understood to express or signal a panoply of social characteristics and
behavioral traits—indeed many theorists view dress as akin to language, which
208
many view as a (perhaps the) defining trait of the human species. “Being

203. Among other comments in her promotion file were statements that Hopkins was “macho,”
that she “overcompensated for being a woman,” that she needed to “take ‘a course at charm
school,’” and that she “ha[d] matured from a tough-talking somewhat masculine hard-nosed mgr to
an authoritative, formidable, but much more appealing lady ptr [partner] candidate.” Id. at 235
(alterations added).
204. See Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to
Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995) (finding that subjects
construed the same actions differently depending on, for example, the race of the actor); Jerry Kang,
Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489 (2005) (describing the psychological literature on
“priming,” which demonstrates the clear impact of subconscious self-categorization upon individual
performance).
205. See RIDLEY, supra note 188, at 146–59 (collecting and discussing studies demonstrating that
the preferred males are also the fittest males by other measures, such as low parasite load, disease
resistance, and offspring success).
206. See discussion supra Part III.A.
207. See discussion supra Part III.B.
208. See Entwistle & Wilson, supra note 190, at 2 (“A number of theorists [studying dress] saw the
manner in which dress communicated as a kind of language. This may have been partly because it
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clothed . . . is the mark of a distinctively human form of consciousness, of being
209
a ‘person.’”
The idea that dress is trivial is closely tied to the association in
contemporary Western culture of fashion with femininity. Dress is viewed,
210
negatively, as a superficial, female concern. Thus, the notion that dress rules
that facially differentiate on the basis of sex do not give rise to a prima facie case
of sex discrimination is, ironically, an embodiment of exactly the negative sex
stereotyping that the law otherwise condemns. The argument in the grooming
cases based on immutability cannot do all of the work of explaining why sexbased dress codes are treated differently than other types of facial
211
discrimination. Rather, the notion in the case law seems to be that some
combination of mutability and lack of importance is what grounds the
212
articulation of a test that applies uniquely to dress codes. That notion is itself a
reflection of demeaning gender stereotypes. Rather than avoid true analysis by
insisting that enforced dress differences are de minimus, courts should recognize
that dress matters and proceed to a genuine examination of whether they are a
form of impermissible sex discrimination.
B. Wolves, Sheep, and Clothing: Sex, Power, and Dress
Based upon the foregoing discussion, I will assume that dress is non-trivial
and that employer mandated sex distinctions in dress are likewise deserving of
actual analysis rather than ad hoc rules. Like the wolf in sheep’s clothing, dress
rules appear benign but carry hidden dangers of unconscious discrimination
and retrenchment of invidious gender stereotypes. The questions still remain:

had become somewhat commonplace to assert the idea that fashion and dress are ubiquitous to
culture, a fundamental feature which defines humanity.” (alteration added)).
209. Id. at 18 (quoting RENE DESCARTES, A DISCOURSE ON METHOD ETC. 92–93 (Dent 1924)).
210. See BARNARD, supra note 14 (explaining the theory of a “gender imbalance in the structures
of looking,” such that males are assumed to be active and be the “looker,” while females are passive
and are looked at such that “[t]he creation and maintenance of a look, or an appearance, becomes
something like a defining feature of femininity, [which] may be a part of the sense behind the
popular or traditional belief that fashion and clothing are somehow especially or properly the
concern of women rather than of men.” (alterations added)); cf. Case, supra note 21 (arguing that the
denigration of things considered “feminine” is at the root of much sex discrimination and that the
law must therefore protect effeminate men from discrimination on the basis of their expression of
femininity in order also to protect women against sex discrimination); BARNARD, supra note 14, at 2
(noting idea that “for some people, to be fashion conscious or ‘fashionable’ is still deemed to make
you ‘fickle,’ ‘shallow,’ ‘dumb,’ ‘ephemeral’ [and] ‘fascist’ . . . . In many everyday colloquialisms,
fashion, clothing and textiles are associated with deceit and triviality.” (alteration added)).
211. Other traits that are arguably immutable (in the sense that they are not completely outside
the individual’s control) are protected, for example religion and pregnancy. For an illuminating
comparison of courts’ treatment of immutability in the race, sex, and religion contexts, see Karen
Engle, The Persistence of Neutrality: The Failure of the Religious Accommodation Provision to Redeem Title
VII, 76 TEX. L. REV. 317 (1997).
212. See, e.g., Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ’g Co., 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975) (hair length is
neither immutable nor a fundamental right); Austin v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 1254 (N.D.
Ind. 1998) (hair length is neither immutable nor a fundamental right); Pecenka v. Fareway Stores,
Inc., 672 N.W.2d 800 (Iowa 2003) (wearing ear stud implicates neither immutable characteristic nor
fundamental right).
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What should the rules look like and what insight can the study of sexual
selection and animal dress differences provide in answering that question?
In comparing animal and human dress, one intriguing difference presents
itself at the outset: when sexual dimorphism is present in animals, it is nearly
always the male that is the more decorated of the two sexes. In contrast, in
modern Western human societies the relative decoration of the sexes is exactly
213
the reverse. An examination of the evolutionary pressures that result in sexual
dimorphisms in animals suggests some reasons why this anomaly might exist
and also helps answer the question what the legal standard should look like for
214
eliminating barriers to equal employment opportunity for women.
As explained in Part IIIA, sex dimorphisms in color, decoration, and
ornamentation are caused mainly by sexual selection and, in particular,
intersexual selection. That is, the primary way that male animals acquire the
fancy dress that is exemplified by the peacock’s tail is through female preference
215
to mate with males exhibiting the trait. The very best-dressed, fanciest males
216
are those that are members of what are known as “lekking” species. “A lek is a
place where males gather in the breeding season, mark out little territories that
217
are clustered together, and parade their wares for visiting females.” In these
species, the female exercises a rare degree of reproductive choice. A description
by a well-known science writer of the sage grouse lek provides a striking
illustration:

213. Though there have been eras and places in which human males have been highly adorned,
the current pattern has generally prevailed in the West since the end of the French Revolution. See
RUBENSTEIN, supra note 4, at 49–50 (relating that “[a]fter the French Revolution, scions of aristocratic
families in France and England were ridiculed for constructing highly elaborate sartorial
expressions,” that in the 1880’s “[m]en who looked beautiful continued to be denigrated as not being
men,” and that in the U.S. “at least since the beginning of the twentieth century, goal-directed
behavior has been the standard in industrial production” with the concomitant move toward the
dark, somber-colored business suit as the epitome of male status dress). On the other hand, clothing
regulations from medieval times presents an almost exact mirror image of the male-female pattern in
lekking species. These regulations “recognized that to attract a husband women had to wear more
frivolous attire than at other times. Women in the courting stage were allowed to make use of color
and ornament different from what a wife could use.” Id. at 112; see also id. at 123–25.
214. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429–30 (1971) (“The objective of Congress
in the enactment of Title VII is plain from the language of the statute. It was to achieve equality of
employment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an
identifiable group of . . . employees over other employees.”) (alteration in original); Phillips v.
Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971) (“Section 703 (a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
requires that persons of like qualifications be given employment opportunities irrespective of their
sex.”).
215. This is in contrast to dimorphisms involving size and weaponry, which are more often
caused by intrasexual selection, or competition between males. One author describes the peacock
thus: “Peacocks are among the few birds that run a kind of market in seduction techniques, called a
“lek” after the Swedish word for play.” RIDLEY, supra note 188, at 140–41.
216. See WILSON, supra note 188, at 331–32. As Wilson notes, “[t]he most complicated and
spectacular lek systems occur in birds,” and “[t]he males belonging to species on this list [of ten
families of lekking species of birds] are among the most colorful of the bird world. The brilliant red
cock of the rock, for example, is easily the most spectacular cotingid, and the birds of paradise are
justly considered the most beautiful of all birds.” Id. (alterations added).
217. RIDLEY, supra note 188, at 141.
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It is an extraordinary experience to drive out to the middle of Wyoming before
dawn, stop the car on a featureless plain that looks like every other one, and see
it come alive with dancing grouse. Each knows his place; each runs through his
routine of inflating the air sacs in his breast and strutting forward, bouncing the
fleshy sacs through his feathers for all the world like a dancer at the Folies
Bergere. The females wander through this market, and after several days of
contemplating the goods on offer, they mate with one of the males. That they are
choosing, not being forced to choose, seems obvious: The male does not mount
218
the female until she squats in front of him.

The correlation between fancy dress and female choice is that the males
must entice the females to choose them or lose out in the contest for
reproductive success. In lekking species, a small number of males do most of the
mating and the rest of the males go home empty-handed, so to speak. This
dynamic creates selection pressures for showy displays of the sort that the
females prefer. The females, in this sense, are possessed of a good deal of
219
reproductive choice and a certain degree of power and autonomy. The males,
conversely, are looking to be chosen.
For humans, in contrast, the contemporary Western norm posits that
females should be the showy sex. They are expected to wear more colorful
clothing than men, to color their faces with makeup, and to display certain body
parts. Just as this is a reversal of the dress dimorphism pattern among
nonhuman animal species, so might we hypothesize that it is a reversal of the
power dimorphism as well. In other words: the prevalent gender based norm
that requires women to be the fancier sex is likely to reveal a power differential
that is both reflected and perpetuated by such a gender dress norm. Such a
norm, then, is neither trivial nor benign.
Courts already evidence a suspicion of dress codes that seem to mandate
220
female sexiness. The animal dress research suggests that this suspicion is not
only well grounded, but that it does not go far enough. Not just blatantly
sexually provocative attire, but any dress policy that requires women employees
to be more colorful, more decorated, or to show more of their bodies should
raise an inference that the policy is discriminatory on the basis of sex.
Likewise, courts have struck down as discriminatory uniform requirements
that seemed to imply a power or status differential between male and female

218. Id. The picture is not all freedom and play for the female, however: “Minutes later his job is
done, and her long and lonely parenthood is beginning. She has received only one thing from her
mate—genes—and it looks as if she has tried hard to get the best there were to be had.” Id.
219. Sexual coercion is not seen in lekking species as it is often seen in other species, including
those in which the males are significantly larger than the females or in which the dimorphisms are
otherwise the result of intrasexual (male-male) selection. For discussions of sexual coercion among
animals, see Barbara B. Smuts & Robert W. Smuts, Male Aggression and Sexual Coercion of Females in
Nonhuman Primates and Other Mammals: Evidence and Theoretical Implications, 22 ADVANCES STUDY
BEHAV. 1–63 (1993); T.H. Clutton-Brock & G. Parker, Punishment in Animal Societies, 373 NATURE 209
(1995).
220. See EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Gerdom v. Cont’l Airlines,
692 F.2d 602, 605 (9th Cir. 1982); Laffey v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 763, 774 (D.D.C. 1973). See
also discussion supra notes 66–69 and accompanying text.
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221

Viewed through the prism of sexual selection, power and
employees.
decoration are closely related. Forcing women to wear makeup and reveal their
legs, as much as forcing them to wear a uniform when males in similar positions
do not, implies that they are objects of selection rather than agents of choice and
authority.
Several scholars have in recent years turned their focus to the problems of
222
unconscious discrimination and cognitive biases. Dress, as the aspect of
individuals that others see first and see most clearly, cannot but be a part of any
assessment of the individual employee, just as the peahen cannot but be
influenced by the size, brightness, and symmetry of the peacock’s tail. Because
dress is so crucial a characteristic in sexually dimorphic species, and because it is
so closely tied to sexual attractiveness, choice, and power dynamics, employers
should be prohibited from requiring women to dress in gender normative ways
that reflect those traits even if they believe that such dress codes do not amount
223
to intentional sex stereotyping. Where, as here, so many threads come together
to demonstrate that sex differences in dress are likely to affect the way that
individuals are treated by others, employers should not be permitted to
mandate differences that implicate notions of attractiveness or power.
V. CONCLUSION
People are not peafowl, and yet an examination of sex-based dress norms
cannot but evoke the image of the peacock strutting his stuff or the male sage
224
grouse shimmying his breast like a burlesque dancer. Nor can it fail to
illuminate the contrast between the plain females in such animal species and the
modern Western dress norms that cast males as drab and colorless and females
as fancy. Such dress differences among animals are caused by sexual selection
225
and, in that sense, are most certainly “because of . . . sex.” More significant, the
extent and nature of these dress dimorphisms among nonhuman animals reflect
male-female power dynamics and are closely related to sexual attractiveness
and mating behavior. Indeed, sexual behavior and power dynamics are two
sides of the same coin and cannot logically be separated in the context of animal
dress: males are fancier precisely because females have more power.
Courts in the workplace dress cases have already exhibited some sensitivity
to the factors of sexuality and power status where women have challenged sexdifferentiated dress requirements, though they have not explicitly related these
two concerns nor applied them in any systematic way. An examination of the
221. See Carroll v. Talman Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Chi., 604 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1979);
O’Donnell v. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 263 (S.D. Ohio 1987); EEOC v.
Clayton Fed. Sav. & Loan Assoc., 1981 WL 152 (E.D. Mo. 1981).
222. See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987); Krieger, supra note 204; Ann C. McGinley, ¡Viva La
Evolucion!: Recognizing Unconscious Motive in Title VII, 9 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 415 (2000); Amy
L. Wax, Discrimination as Accident, 74 IND. L. J. 1129 (1999).
223. See Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1106 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc)
(finding no evidence that Harrah’s intended to enforce a sex stereotype).
224. See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
225. Title VII imposes this requirement as a basis for a finding of sex discrimination. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(2) (2000).
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sexual selection literature reveals that all dress dimorphisms are essentially and
inextricably entwined with the elements of sexuality and power. The fancier the
dress, the more power exercised by the undecorated sex. When viewed in that
light, it becomes impermissible—indeed inexcusable—for employers to
mandate, and for courts to validate, dress and grooming differences that reflect
226
social gender norms of attractiveness and decoration.

226. I do not address here the problem of sex related businesses such as the late Playboy Club or
strip clubs. In a sense, those cases involve not sex-differentiated dress codes but sex-based hiring
pure and simple (though of course, once hired, female employees are required to dress in a highly
sexualized manner). Thus, the issue is distinct and is beyond the scope of this Article.

